W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects

Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects

1984

The New Right
Elizabeth Julia Reiley
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Reiley, Elizabeth Julia, "The New Right" (1984). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper
1539625286.
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-mnnb-at94

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.

THE NEW RIGHT
'f

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Sociology
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Elizabeth Reiley
1984

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Elizabeth

Approved, May 1984
Edwin H . Rhyn<

Satoshi Ito

Dedicated to
Pat
Thanks, brother,
for sharing your love, your life,
and for making us laugh.
We feel you with us still.
Presen te!

iii.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

...........................

v

A B S T R A C T ....................................

vi

INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I.

................................
THE NEW RIGHT

. '............

6

THE 1980 ELECTIONS

CHAPTER III.

THE PRO-FAMILY COALITION . .

69

CHAPTER IV.

THE NEW RIGHT:

95

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CONCLUSION

.. .

1

CHAPTER II.

CHAPTER V.

.

s

BEYOND 1980

52

...............

114

..................................

130

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The writer wishes to express her appreciation
to all the members of her committee for the time they
gave to the reading and criticism of the manuscript,
especially Dr. Edwin Rhyne for chairing the thesis
committee, and Dr. Satoshi Ito for keeping the project
alive during its difficult beginning stages.

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the leadership, organizational
base and ideology of the New Right and analyzes its
rapid rise to political prominence in the late 1970s
and early 1980s.
The New R i g h t ’s impact on American
electoral politics is also probed through studying
its role in the 1980 and 1982 elections.
It is argued that it is its political pragmatism,
coupled with its emphasis on social issues which most
distinguishes the New Right from the ’’old Right."
While economic conservatism and anticommunism have
not diminished in importance for the New Right, it is
its social conservatism which most defines the New
Right outlook.
By bringing together the constituencies of
the anti-abortion, anti-gay, anti-ERA and pro-school
prayer groups, the New Right was able to broaden its
base of support and reach sectors of the population
not attracted to older right-wing movements.
The
New Right gave leadership to, and drew together into
a "pro-family" coalition, these single-issue groups
that arose in the 1970s, many of which represent the
backlash against the political and cultural radicalism
of the 1960s.
In the Conclusion, some of the weaknesses as
well as the strengths of modern Sociology’s understanding
of right-wing movements are pointed out.
It is argued
that where liberal Sociology is lacking, feminist
theory offers an analysis that better provides an
understanding of the centrality of the politics of
family, sexuality, and reproduction to the New R i g h t ’s
ideology and political program.

THE NEW RIGHT

INTRODUCTION
When Ronald Reagan was elected to the Presidency
in 1980 and the Republican Party— for the first time in
twenty-six years— gained control of the Senate, New
Right leaders confidently claimed that conservatism had
come of age.

Gary Jarmin, Washington director of the

Christian Voice/Moral Government Fund (which contributed
money to several winning candidates)

said that the

election wave "points to the beginning of a new era."
(Ellerin, 1981:55)
Viguerie said,

New Right direct-mail wizard Richard

"The simple truth is that there is a new

majority in America— and i t Ts being led by the New Right."
(Viguerie,

1981:4)

John "Terry" Dolan, Chairperson of

the National Conservative Political Action Committee
said,

(NCPAC)

"The 1980 election gave the conservative movement

the most massive political victory in its history."
(Conservative Digest, 11/80:7)
With the conservative victory in 1980, the New Right
also had come of age.

As early as 1977., the former

executive director of the Republican National Committee
commented on the political strength of the New Right:
"If you ranked political institutions in this country,
organized labor would be first, the Democratic Party would
be second, the Republican Party is third.
2.

The Viguerie

3.
network is unquestionably fourth."
6/77:12)
apparatus.

(Conservative Digest,

The "Viguerie network" refers to the New Right
By 1980 the New Right had proved itself to

be a major political force in American politics.
1980,

And by

"moral majority"— which is now used as a shorthand

term for the whole religious Right— had become a household
word.
Conservative Alan Crawford (former aide to Senator
James Buckley and former assistant editor of Conservative
Digest) offers an "insider’s" account of the New Right in
his book,, Thunder on the Right

(1980) .

He describes it as

an institutionalized, disciplined, well-organized, and
well-financed movement which capitalizes on the passions
behind single-issue causes.

The New Right, he says,

feeds on discontent, anger, insecurity and
resentment and flourishes on backlash
politics.
Through its interlocking network
it seeks to veto whatever it perceives to
threaten its way of life— busing, w o m e n ’s
liberation, gay rights, pornography, loss
of the Panama Canal— and promotes a beefedup defense budget, lower taxes, and reduced
federal regulation of small business.
(Crawford, 1980:5)
Crawford views the New Right as a political movement which
has already proved its potential as a political force to
be taken seriously in that it has
already reshaped, in significant ways, the
face of Congress, stalled legislation in
its tracks, and pushed through initiative and
referenda.
It has its eye on the presidency
in coming years, vowing, as one New Right
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leader told me, ’to take control of the
culture.’ Unlike right-wing zealots
of the recent past, the New Right has
built the organizational structure to make
good that promise. (Crawford, 1980:4)
In his introduction to Richard V iguerie’s book,
The New Right: W e ’re Ready to Lead (1981) Moral Majority's
leader, Jerry Falwell, describes those people who make up
the New R i g h t :

Mr. Viguerie uses the term the 'New Right' to
speak of those moral citizens who now must
come together to let their voices be heard,
those he has described as the backbone of
our country - those citizens who are pro-family,
pro-moral, pro-life and pro-American, who
have integrity and believe in hard work, those
who pledge allegiance to the flag and proudly
sing our national anthem. (Viguerie, 1981:
Introduction)
Conservative Kevin Phillips, who first coined the
term "New Right" in the mid-70s,

contends that the basic

premise behind the New Right is the idea that the present
two-party system is not effective and that the federal
government does not represent "the people."

A new

conservative coalition which would join conservative
Democrats, Republicans and Independents, he maintained,
was needed to:
displace the existing governmental elite
and restore fiscal responsibility, military
preparedness, global purpose and a more
family-church-neighborhood-oriented culture.
(Conservative Diges t, 3/79:21)
Allen Hunter, in the leftist journal Radical America,
describes New Right ideology as an expression of a
political and cultural backlash against the social
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movements and liberal policies of the 1960s.

New Right

ideology, he says,
is a defense of the male-headed family
against its alternatives; of America against
its external and internal enemies; of
capitalist free enterprise against its
socialist and welfare-state alternatives.
It is a defense of hard work and virtue
against moral lassitude and sexual freedom,
of whites against blacks, of men against women,
of parents against children.
It is a politics
that seeks to regain control of America for
the white middle strata of America, Tthe
people' who felt they were bypassed and put
down by the changes of the 1960s.
(Hunter, 1981:113-14)
This paper will describe the rise of the New R i g h t .
I will identify its leadership and discuss its organizational
base and its ideology.
pragma ti sm
resources),

I will argue that the New Right's

(coupled with its organizati ona l base and
and its emphasis on social issues,

it from the "old" Right.
"pro-family movement."
movement because:

distinguish

I will detail the New Right's
I will focus on the pro-family

a) it is its focus on social issues,

particularly family and sex-related issues, which makes
the New Right n e w ; b) the pro-family movement played a

significant role in the New Right's rise to political
prominence,

and c) it was through the pro-family coalition

that the secular Right and the religious Right established
a working relationship.

Finally, after describing the New

Right's perceived setback at the polls in 1982, I will
discuss its present articulation of a "new populism" politics.

CHAPTER I
THE NEW RIGHT

Ronald Reagan, writes New Right columnist William
Rusher,

did not "spring full-blown from the brow of Jove

in 1980...and the conservative movement whose triumph he
symbolizes has been around for quite awhile."

(Rusher, 1982:3)

The origins of the New Right can be traced back to the
1964 presidential campaign of Barry Goldwater.

"The seeds

of the contemporary New Right," says Paul Weyrich "were
sown by the Goldwater campaign.

Most of us can, in our

personal histories, mark that campaign as the beginning
of the motivation that has never left us."

(Weyrich, 1982:51)

The Goldwater campaign introduced the conservatives of
America to one another.
further:

But the New Right goes back even

it has roots in the conservative movement of the

1950s which arose in response to, says Rusher,
(1) the enormous expansion of the federal
government in and after Franklin Rooseve lt’s
administration, and (2) the emergence of
world Communism as Am erica’s principal
international enemy in the years following
World War II. (Rusher, 1982:5)
It was not until after 1974, after Watergate, that
the New Right - as it is known today - took on organizational
coherence.

Four men - Richard Viguerie, Paul Weyrich,

Howard Phillips and John "Terry" Dolan - each of whom
6.

control a core organization, laid the organizational
foundation for the New Right movement.

Disappointed with

both Nixon and Ford (whom they felt were "moderate"
Republicans rather than true conservatives), they believed
that one of the main problems conservatives had in
building and organizing a political movement was the lack
of strong leadership.

Unlike the Left, which they felt

had consistently had congressional leadership over the
past two decades

(in the persons of Birch Bayh, George

McGovern, Frank Church, Edward Kennedy, for instance),
they viewed the Right as lacking in both congressional
leadership and in viable political organizations.
"Goldwater had provided some leadership in the early 1960s
as had Strom Thurmond and a few others in isolated
instances.

But by the late 1960s there was no such leader.

(Weyrich, 1982:59)

A few men stepped in to fill the

leadership vacuum, and the New Right was born.
Viguerie, one of those men, describes it:

As Richard

"I decided to

stop following and start doing some leading of my own."
(Viguerie, 1981:51)
Viguerie details the inception of the New Right.
In August,

197^3 upon hearing that then-President Gerald

Ford had selected Nelson Rockefeller to be his VicePresident, Viguerie contacted about fourteen conservative
friends to meet at his house.

They met to discuss how

they could stop Rockefeller— whom they considered to be a
"high-flying, wild-spending leader of the Eastern liberal

8.
establishment"— from becoming Vice-President.
(Viguerie, 1981:5)

Viguerie commented:

For many of us it was the last straw.
More than that, it was a revelation.
It
taught us that our very loyalty to the
Republican Party had made us powerless— even within the Party.
The only way
for conservatives to have influence,
or to bring pressure on the Republican
Party in the future, was to declare
our independence. (Viguerie, 1982:28)
Although they were not successful in stopping Rockefeller,
they were on their way to forming the organizations
necessary to launch and keep afloat a political movement.
(Weyrich, 1982:59)
planned together",

"The more we talked and worked and
explained Viguerie,

"the more we

realized we could m a k e ... important things happen.

We

learned together and we helped educate each other about
movement building."

(Viguerie, 1981:53)

New Right Leadership/The "Big Four" and their Organizations
The New Right...is so tight-knit...that
any diagram of it looks like an octopus
trying to shake hands with itself, so
completely interlocked are the
directorates of its various components.
Basically, however, the movement can
almost be understood by a glance at its
unofficial politboro, which consists of
four men and a couple of computers.
(Davis, 1980:21)
The four men Davis refers to, as already mentioned, are:
Richard Viguerie, Howard Phillips, Paul Weyrich and John
"Terry" Dolan.

These four men, who make up the core of

the New Right leadership, do not hold elective office.
Instead, they run various ideological groups, publish

9.
magazines and newsletters, operate political action
committees and control major direct mail and fundraising
organizations.

While there are other significant

leaders, these four men, writes Alan Crawford, are the
self-appointed,

"real" leaders, with New Right elected

officials being "followers out front."

(Crawford, 1980:269)

Richard Viguerie
Widely recognized as a fund-raising genius,
Viguerie was active in Senator John To wer’s (RepublicanTexas) political campaign in I960 and was executive
secretary of Young Americans for Freedom during the 1960s.
His two political heroes during college, he says, were
"the two Macs"— Douglas MacArthur and Joseph McCarthy.
Uncomfortable with asking people directly for money
for conservative causes, he started using the direct mail
approach and had such success that by 1965 he founded his
own direct mail company.

(Viguerie, 1981:23-32)

Richard A. Viguerie Company

The

(RAVCO) claims to have on

computer the names of ten to twenty million conservative
donors, distributes more than two million pieces of mail
a week, and has raised millions of dollars for New Right
causes and candidates.

(Ellerin, 1981:57)

Columnist

Mary McGrory, in 1977, said of Viguerie and his direct
mail empire:
The firebase of the enemies of the Panama
Canal treaty is the modern Falls Church
office of Richard A. Viguerie, from which
2 million anti-treaty letters will have

10.
been mailed by the end of this week.
He can stuff Capitol Hill mailboxes
to overflowing in short order.
On
one quick job for the Committee for
the Survival of a Free Congress* he
flooded Senate offices with 600*000
letters against the nomination of
Paul Warnke as arms negotiator— and
helped rally 40 negative votes.
He did a mailing of 500*000 against
public financing of congressional
campaigns* which went down in the
Senate* for the National Conservative
Political Action Committee* and one of
two million against repeal of the
Hatch Act* which is stalled in
committee* for the Americans Against
Union Control of Government.
(Washington Star * 9/27/77)
Viguerie* who is sometimes called the "Godfather”
of the New Right* also owns Viguerie Communications
Corporation which includes such publications as
Conservative Digest* the monthly New Right magazine*
and The New Right Rep ort * a biweekly newsletter.

He has

also produced ’’The SALT Syndrome"— a television film
w h i c h 'featured Senator Jesse Helms and other Congressional
leaders opposed to the Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaties.

(Ellerin* 1981:57)

A key factor in the growth of Vigu e r i e ’s directmail empire was Watergate* which produced the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1974— a campaign finance reform
enacted by Congress* which limited personal contributions
to $1*000 per candidate per election.

(Viguerie*

1981:37)

These reforms— their stated purpose being to limit the
amount of money spent by individual presidential

11.
candidates— simply shifted the source of money.
of the "fat cats" was reduced*

The role

"but the power of a tiny

number of technicians who have learned to raise small
amounts of money from large numbers of contributors was
vastly increased."

(Crawford* 1980:44)

And Viguerie is

the acknowledged expert at reaching large numbers of
supporters for contributions.
Viguerie*

in addition*

other New Right organizations.

is active in numerous
Says Crawford*

He sometimes exercises great control over
the political organizations with which he
is associated.
The consolidation of
that control goes far to account for the growth
and influence of the New Right. (Crawford*
1980:43)
Paul Weyrich
According to Viguerie* Paul Weyrich "may be the
single most important conservative in America today."
(Conservative Dig est * 8/78:48)

He is acknowledged by

political observers on the Left as well as the Right as
being one of the shrewdest politicians in the nation.
(Conservative Diges t* 7/81:2)
Weyrich formed the Committee for the Survival
of a Free Congress in 1974* which provides funds for
New Right candidates and does cadre training and
specializes in developing organizations at the precinct
level.

It also serves as a focal point for conservative

lobbying on Capitol Hill and is an important information
resource for the conservative movement.

In the 1978
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election* the Committee for the Survival of a Free
Congress came of age* helping to elect 38 conservative
candidates* including Senators Gordon Humphrey* Roger
Jepsen* Bill Armstrong and John Warner.

The Committee

gives not only money* but even more importantly (in
W e y rich1s opinion)* technical assistance and advice.
Weyrich has adopted the "Fasten Plan"— named after
Senator Kasten of Wisconsin— as the core of his training
sessions and schools.

In the Kasten Plan* a specific

voter turnout goal is set for every precinct in a
congressional dist ric t.

The precinct chairperson is given

the responsibility of meeting that goal.
Digest * 7/81:4)

(Conservative

In order to win the Committee’s

endorsement* the candidate has to answer a 72-item
questionnaire to determine whether the candidate is a
"real conservative."

They Weyrich and the Committee

decide whether to lend the Committee’s helping hand.
Simply because they support a candidate’s politics does
not mean they will lend their assistance.

Explains

Weyrich:
Obviously if he is going to win without
our assistance* we d o n ’t need to spend
any money on him.
And if his race is
hopeless* t h ere’s no point in spending
any.
What we are looking for are races
where we can make a difference.
(Conservative Dig est * 7/81:5)
In 1980* 59 percent of the Committee for the
Survival of a Free Congress’ funds went into winning

13.
campaigns.

That year the Committee team trained an

estimated 7,000 volunteers for Moral Majority* Phyllis
Sch lafl y’s Eagles* the Right to Life Movement* and people
involved with Right to Work* national defense and other
conservative groups.

(Conservative Dig est * 7/81:6)

With financial assistance from brewer Joseph Coors*
Weyrich founded and was first president of the Heritage
Foundation* the New R i g h t ’s think tank.

After the 1980

election* the Heritage Foundation presented Reagan with
a 20-volume study which recommended such measures as the
re-establishment of the House Un-American Activities
Committee and the Internal Security Committee of the
McCarthy period.

It also recommended economic and military

support to right-wing military governments in Latin
America* a reduced emphasis on human rights as the basis
for United States foreign policy* and the elimination of
affirmative action programs.

(Hall* 1981:5)

Weyrich is also president of the Free Congress
Research and Education Foundation*

started in 1978*

which has provided intellectual leadership in the profamily movement*
Right.

coalition politics and the religious

He also heads the Coalitions for America* which

through its three divisions— the Kingston Group* the
Library Court Group and the Stanton Group— serves as a
central forum for nearly 120 different conservative
organizations concerned with domestic policy and economics,
pro-family issues and national defense and international

14.
affairs.

(Conservative Dig est * 7/81:2)

In addition*

Weyrich has founded or played the critical role in other
conservative groups such as the American Legislative
Exchange Council* the Republican Study Committee and the
Senate Steering Committee.
"I can think of no one"* assesses Viguerie*

"who

better symbolizes or is more important to the conservative
movement than Paul Weyrich."

He is the man with the

"broadest vision" for the New Right* considered to be the
best strategist and coordinator of the New R i g h t ’s develop
ment.

(Viguerie*

1981:53)

Weyrich can be found

thinking up legislative strategy...holding
meetings with wavering members of Congress...
cleverly recruiting new allies into the
f i g h t ...suggesting the right leader to
take charge of the battle on the floors
of both houses of Congress... providing key
arguments to the right journalists...and*
in general* taking a heavy burden of the
battle on his shoulders. (Conservative
Digest * 8/78:48)
While intimately involved in the full range of New Right
political activities* W e y r i c h ’s greatest asset* according
to Viguerie*

is his ability to see the interrelations of

all New Right activities and his ability to help
"orchestrate conservative activity on all fronts."
(Conservative Dige st* 8/78:4)
Weyrich was the one who initially perceived the
importance of the pro-family social issues and the
political potential of fundamentalist Protestantism.
(Hunter* 1981:118)

Weyrich* believing that family issues

15.
would constitute the major political background of the
1980s* has "become a master" at persuading pro-family
groups to join the conservative coalition.
Digest * 6/79:14)

(Conservative

He believes family-oriented concerns

to be the wave of the future for conservatives.

He argues

that millions of Americans have been politically awakened
by such social issues as voluntary prayer in the school*
abortion* and "liberal" legislation such as the Domestic
Vio len ce Bill.

He says*

As pro-family groups become better educated
in the political process* a lot of congress
men who today thumb their noses at the whole
notion of a pro-family coalition are going
to be humbled. (Conservative Digest* 7/81:8)
How ard Phillips

"What Paul Weyrich is to the conservative movement
in Washington" says Viguerie*

"Howard Phillips is to the

grass-roots movement around the country."
58)

(Viguerie*

1981:

Phillips* also a graduate of Young Americans for

Freedom* was brought into the Nixon Administration to
abolish the Office of Economic Opportunity

(0E0) and its

programs; however* as "Richard Nixon became more and more
preoccupied with Watergate* liberal White House staffers
decided 0E0 dismantlement was too controversial."
(Viguerie*

1981:51)

Disillusioned with Nixon* Phillips

went on to found Conservative Caucus.
With the aid of V iguerie1s mailing lists* Phillips
founded and is national director of the Conservative Caucus*

16.
which mobilizes constituents to put pressure on members
of Congress* and provides the leadership to mobilize
grassroots sentiment and action.

Phillips recognizes the

political strength of the Conservative Caucus through
its work at the grassroots level* in the communities where
people live.

He says*

We have three basic jobs: to recruit and
train local leaders* to lobby at the
grassroots level* and to help set the
agenda for national debate, by emphasizing
the conservative viewpoint on key issues.
If we fight only at the national level* we
lose.
But using our strength at the local
level* at the grassroots, we can win.
(Viguerie* 1 9 8 1 :58)
Phillips believes that being able to determine the
issues is where lies the power and strength of a
movement.

Defining power as "the ability to tell others

what the issues are* what the issues mean* and who the
good guys and the bad guys are*" Phillips says that
conservatives have to "put themselves in the position
where they can choose the grounds for conflict."
(Conservative Digest* 3/80:11)

For example* he noted that

the 1974 election became a referendum on Watergate* to
the disadvantage of conservatives* and was used to
"defuse the rising conservative tide in America."
(Conservative Digest* 3/80:10)
Phillips believes that for too long conservatives
tried to wage their battle in Washington* where the
liberals were most influential.

"We have to build

political mechanisms in the grassroots.

We need a local

17.
power structure for conservatives* to contend with the
Washington power structure of the liberals."
Digest * 9/75:11)

(Conservative

Conservatives should mobilize their

assets by "fighting a guerrilla conflict at the congress
ional district level" rather than by "fighting a pitched
battle with liberals on their terrain in Washington."
(Conservative Di gest* 3/80:11)

He believes that Congress

is the crucial arena of struggle for conservatives.
If we can get two-thirds in both houses
of Congress* we cannot be stopped.
With
control of Congress* we could limit the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court if we
wanted to.
We can abolish inferior
courts.
We can eliminate the Department
of Health* Education and Welfare.
Congress
can control what the bureaucracy does.
Congress can control what the courts do.
Whether it be foreign policy* domestic
policy* economic or social policy*
Congress is the key. (Conservative Digest*
3/ 8 0 :11 )
The philosophy behind the Caucus is to bring
together social and economic conservatives at a level
where pressure can be brought on individual congresspeople.
A byproduct of this philosophy is that the Caucus is a
natural breeding ground for future political leaders.
Gordon Humphrey started his political career* for example*
as New Hampshire State Coordinator for the Caucus.
(Conservative Digest* 6/79:15)
Phillips also worked with Weyrich in setting up
Moral Majority.

The only answer for America* he told

Alan Crawford* is to "resort to Biblical law."
(Crawford* 1980:271)

18.
John "Terry" Dolan

Dolan heads the National Conservative Political
Action Committee (NCPAC)* which was founded in 1974.
The largest conservative PAC* it distributed over $2.3
million in cash and in-kind contributions to political
campaigns in 1980.

It also spends millions of dollars

in other areas such as advertising to elect conservatives.
(Viguerie*

1981:56)

NCPAC* under D o l a n ’s direction*

came to be known

for its training seminars for both candidates and campaign
personnel on ways to set up a campaign structure and for its
high-quality campaign services.

The successful campaign

of Gordon Humphrey (Republican - New Hampshire)*

for

instance* was built around trainees from these seminars.
He and other conservative leaders such as Senator Orrin
Hatch* and Representatives Robert Dornan and Philip
Crane have termed N C P A C Ts aid invaluable and said they
would not be in Congress without the organization’s help.
(Crotty*

1980:147;

Conservative Digest* 12/80:2)

NCPAC was described by the Congressional Quarterly
as the "most effective" of the conservative organizations
in 1976 when 6 7% of the candidates it supported were elected.
In 1978*

71% of its candidates won.

(Conservative Dig es t* 1/79:26)

During the 1980 elections* N C P A C ’s "Target 80" program was
aimed at removing from office the Sena t e ’s most liberal
members and over $1.2 million was spent on television*
radio*

literature and direct mail used against them.

The

19.
results were that of the five Senators targeted by NCPAC,
four of them - McGovern,
defeated.

Church,

Only Alan Cranston,

Culver and Bayh - were

(Democrat-California), of

the originally targeted incumbents,
re-elected.

survived and was

(Conservative Digest, 12/80:2-3)

Unlike most other Political Action Committees,
NGPAC makes a point of involving itself in state elections,
both gubernatorial and legislative.

Working on this level,

they are able to directly affect issues being decided by
state legislatures such as the Equal Rights Amendment
ratification and the D.C. Amendment.

And by campaigning

on the state level, which provides a wide variety of
campaign situations, they are able to test new campaign
techniques at minimal cost.

Involvement on this level

of politics also affords the opportunity to locate and
develop future conservative leaders.

NCPAC also involves

itself extensively in primary races, assessing that
financial assistance in a primary often does more good
than in a general election, when money and technical support especially from the major political parties - is more
readily available to candidates. (Conservative Digest ,
1/79:26-27)
Dolan also chairs the Washington Legal Foundation,
one of the New R i g h t ’s pro-business "public interest" law
firms that were created in response to the Ralph Nader
groups.

The Foundation has battled federal agencies such

as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
and it provides major legal assistance to conservatives.

20.
Dolan also co-chairs the Conservatives Against Liberal
Legislation (CALL), a lobbying group.
58; Hunter,

1981:118;

(Viguerie, 1981:

Conservative Digest, 8/78:47)

Direct mail keeps D o l a n ’s organizations afloat,
and his high-pitched fund-raising appeals, he explained
to Crawford, are aimed to "make

’em angry...stir up

hostilities... We are trying to be divisive...
you are, the better it is to raise money."

The shriller

(Crawford, 1980:227)

While these four men laid the foundation for, and
provide the core leadership of the New Right, there are
other significant leaders as well.
Reverend Jerry Falwe ll, most well-known and
prominent of the religious New Right, he founded and
heads the Moral Majority;
Phyllis Schlafly, founder and national chairperson
of Stop ERA;
Morton Blackwell, contributing editor to Conservative
Digest, he was chairperson of the Committee for Responsible
Youth Politics
Institute.

(CRYP) and president of the Leadership

Through these groups, he has "recruited and

trained literally thousands of young men and women, hundreds
of whom now hold responsible positions in the conservative
movement at national,

state and local levels."

(Viguerie, 1981:59)

Alan Gottlieb, executive director of the Citizens
Committee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms;
L t . General Daniel Graham, top security expert and

21.
and spo ke spe rson for the New Right,

co-chairper son of the

Coalition for Peace Through Strength;
Reed L a r s o n , president of the National Right to
Wor k Committee;
Edwin Feulner,

president of the Heritage Foundation;

Daniel J. P o p e i o , executive director of the W a s h in gt on
Legal Foundation;
Kathy T e a g u e , executive director of the American
Legislative Exchange Council;
Reverend Robert B i l l i n g s , executive director of
Moral Majority;
Lee E d w a r d s , original direct or of the Committee for
Responsibl e Youth Politics and the first editor of
Conservative D i g e s t ;
Greg H i l t o n , executive director of the Conservative
Victory Fund;
Paul B r o w n , formerly executive secretary of the
National Right to Life Committee,

president of American

Life Lobby;
Peter B.

G e m m a , national dir ec tor of the National

Pro-Life Political Action Committee;
David D e n h o l m , president of the Public Service Research
Council

(P S R C );
Rhonda S t a h l m a n , co-c hai rperson of Conservatives

Against Liberal Legislation;
Lew U h l e r , chairperson of the National Tax Limitation
Committee.

Prominent New Right leaders in Congress are
Republican Senators Jesse Helms
Laxalt (Nevada), James McClure

(North Carolina), Paul
(Idaho), Orrin H a t c h ,

Jake Garn (Utah), Harrison Schmitt
Wallop (Wyoming), Gordon Humphrey

(New Mexico), Malcolm
(New Hampshire),

Roger Jepsen (Iowa), William Armstrong ('Colorado) and
Steve Symms

(Idaho).

there are Republicans

And in the House of Representatives,
(Phillip Crane (Illinois), Robert

Dornan (California), Mickey Edwards
(Illinois), Newt Gingrich (Georgia).
Crawford,

(Oklahoma), Henry Hyde
(Viguerie, 1981:99-107

1980:267-268; Conservative Dige st, 8/78:47)

The New Religious Right
Historically, there has been a general linkage
between fundamentalist religion and conservative politics.
(Johnston, 1982:181)

Closely allied to the secular New

Right by common political interest is the religious New
Right, or what one sociologist has called "The New
Christian Right."

(Johnston, 1982:181)

The secular and

the religious Right have established a working relationship
around their deep involvement in "family issues",
particularly abortion.

They are opposed to abortion, the

Equal Rights Amendment, gay rights, sex education in the
schools, because they believe that they "undermine the
traditional nuclear family, the authority of husbands and
parents, the domestic order of wife and mother, and the
entire social and moral order."

(Oliker, 1 9 8 1 :8l)

As a
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result of what they perceive to be government attacks on
the family and a general decline in moral values in the
nation, conservative Christians, particularly fundament
alist Protestants, began to be "politicized.”

Together

with the secular New Right they have organized around
four aims:

pro-life,, pro-moral, pro-family, and

pro-American.
The alliance of the secular and religious Right
has benefited both parties;

combined, the two groups

have made the New Right conservative movement a much
more powerful movement.

The merging of these two groups

was not an accidental phenomenon, but rather was the
result of strategic planning by New Right leaders:
It the merger is the result of the
conscious recruiting efforts of leaders
of the Right Wing like Paul Weyrich and
Howard Phillips.
As they developed the
strategy of mobilizing constituents
around single issues, they found in the
evangelical movement a potential
constituency for their formerly unsellable
economic program— a program that
historically has lacked support.
Cloaked
under the banner of anti-ERA, anti-gay
rights, and now pro-morality and proGod, the Right has found a new platform,
around which they may mobilize voters.
(Huntington, 1982:76)
The Religious Right, too, has benefited from this
alliance, and its leadership has gained political
sophistication as a result of the alliance:
Preachers who had been calling for the
n a t i o n ’s return to ’Christian’ values
in government, school and society at
large have learned how to become vocal,

2H .

with the help of right-wing strategists,
on questions like school prayer and
school tax exemption.
They learned
how to mobilize their constituency
into religious and political arenas.
(Huntington, 1982:76)
While fundamentalists— ministers and followers
alike--have historically been reluctant to engage in
political activity under an explicitly religious banner,
the new religious Right aggressively engages in political
activity in the name of fundamentalist Christianity.
Urging their constituencies to get involved in political
activity, evangelists like Jerry Falwell and Pat
Robertson hold out to their flock an image of a oncemoral nation gone astray:
Politics and decision-making, the schools
and popular culture had become dominated
by ’huma nis ts,’ who allegedly acted on
secular, amoral whims and desires, rather
than on Biblical moral precepts.
The
litany of ’huma n i s t ’ sins emphasized
issues of culture and morality—
pornography, the rights status of
homosexuals, drug use— but also
included more general politics, such
as the welfare system, the Equal
Rights Amendment, foreign policy and
arms-limitation efforts. (Johnston,
1982 :190 )
These shared concerns, coupled with a resolve to
take political action to achieve legislative objectives,
led to the formation of the Moral Majority, the largest
of the New Right religious organizations.

The religious

Right, and in particular the Moral Majority, has been
instrumental in mobilizing and organizing the conservative
movement.

And many credited the shift of religious voters
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from Carter to Reagan in 1980 with R e agan’s presidential
victory.

Viguerie is quick to acknowledge the signif

icance of the religious R i g h t :
...numerically and perhaps historically,
our most important asset is Dr. Jerry
Falwell's Moral Majority.
Thanks to
it and similar groups, the n a t i o n ’s
evangelical Christians, who had favored
Jimmy Carter over Gerald Ford by 56$
to ^3% in 1976, went for Reagan over
Carter by 56$ to 3^% in 1980!
(Viguerie, 1981:8)
Although the Moral Majority is explicitly a religious
organization, may of the pro-family groups, though not
themselves explicitly religious, rely heavily on a
conservative religious constituency.

The most obvious

example is pro-life groups which are made up mainly of
morally conservative Catholics and Protestants.
Antia B r y a n t ’s anti-gay crusade drew most of its members
from ’’Bible-believing” Christians, and Phyllis Schla fly’s
Sto-ERA group received strong support from church groups.
Moral Majority
Formed in 1979 primarily through the efforts of
Reverend Jerry Falwell, the idea for Moral Majority came
out of a meeting in which Ed McAteer, founder and
president of the Religious Roundtable, introduced Howard
Phillips to Falwell and Pat Robertson, another media
preacher.

These leading conservatives decided that the

millions of religious fundamentalists in America were a
"political army waiting to be mobilized."

(Conservative
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D iges t, 7/81:8)

The term "moral majority" was coined by

Howard Phillips and first used publicly by Weyrich in a
presentation to Falwell and his associates.

(Conservative

Di ges t, 7/81:8)
Moral Majority, reporting its membership at
400,000 claims it registered 2.5 million new voters and
re-registered 1 to 1.5 million voters for the 1980
elections.

Since 1979* it has opened up chapters in

47 states.

(Viguerie, 1981:127; Huntington, 1982:70)

Falwell attributes the rapid growth of the Moral Majority
to the fact that it touched a "raw nerve in the American
electorate."

He said:

Pro-moral people, who felt disenfranchised,
saw a rallying point, an organization that
would speak to the issues they were
concerned with but could never get
discussed through the liberal-controlled
media. A majority of decent Americans were
fed up to the teeth with having their values
rejected and, in many cases, reversed by
the power of a government to which they paid
taxes and sent sons to fight wars.
(Conservative Dig est , 1/81:28)
Basically a lobbying and educational organization, Moral
Majority has also raised funds to elect or defeat
selected candidates for political office.

Its goal,

according to Falwell, is to "exert a significant
influence on the spiritual and moral direction of our
nation..."

Various strategies of the Moral Majority for

achieving this goal include:
(a) mobilizing the grassroots of moral
Americans in one clear and effective voice;
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(t>) informing the moral majority what is
going on behind their backs in Washington
and in state legislatures across the
country; (c) lobbying intensely in
Congress to defeat left-wing, socialwelfare bills that will further erode
our precious freedom; (d) pushing for
positive legislation to establish
the Family Protection Agency, which will
ensure a strong, enduring America; and,
(e) helping the moral majority in local
communities to fight pornography,
homosexuality, the advocacy of morality
in school textbooks, and other issues
facing each and every one of us. (Falwell,
1980 :258 )
Falwell, who heads, a 15*000 member Baptist church
in Lynchburg, Virginia, used to criticize clergy who were
involved in politics during the civil rights and anti-war
movements of the 1960s.

He now urges his flock to get

involved in politics, explaining his reversal on that
position on the grounds that the church is being
"assaulted" and "attacked."

Falwell has a radio and TV

show, the Old Time Gospel Hour, which airs on 325 television
stations and 300 radio stations each week, claiming to
reach 15 million Americans.

He once called for a

return to the McCarthy era, where all Communists should
be registered,

saying "we should stamp it on their

foreheads and send them back to Russia."

(Crawford,

1980 :160 )
While the foundation of the Moral Majority is
fundamentalist Protestants, Falwell hopes to build a
coalition with other denominations as well.

The potential

of such a coalition, notes Viguerie, is tremendous:
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There are an estimated 85 million
Americans— 50 million born-again
Protestants, 30 million morally
conservative Catholics, 3 million
Mormons and 2 million Orthodox and
Conservative Jews— with whom to build
a pro-family, Bible-believing coalition.
(Vigueirie, 1980:129)
Pat Robertson, who started the Christian Broadcasting
a?

Network in I960, which today reaches millions of television
viewers,

shares Falwell*s and Vigu erie Ts optomism about

the potential for mobilizing the conservative religious
sectors.

He urges his viewers to become politically

involved so that they can "plaL'cre^ this nation under God.
We have enough votes" he says, "to run this country.
when the poeple say,
to take over."

And

" W e ’ve had eno ug h, ’ we are going

(Crawford, 1980:161; Viguerie,

198l;126)

Daniel Yankelovich, contributing editor to
Psychology Today and author of the book New Rules

(1981)

analyzes the appeal and success of the Moral Majority.
He contends that it is the Moral Ma jority’s concern
with the "moral care and feeding" of children which
is the primary basis for the organization’s appeal.

It

is this concern about the influence of the prevailing
moral climate on young people that gives the Moral Majority
its plausibility to millions of Americans for whom the
Moral Majority is otherwise anathema.

"The organization’s

connection with this concern leads people who would
ordinarily reject its proposals out of hand to say, at least
tacitly,

1981 :8 )

’Well, maybe they have a point."

(Yankelovich,
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Yankelovich argues that many parents are
uncomfortable with the "sweeping permissiveness" that
their own pursuit of permissiveness has created for young
people.

His social-research firm, Yankelovich, Skelly

and White conducted a nationwide study of the American
family, and found that even the most untraditional
parents are likely to raise their children according to
"traditional" moral precepts.

He explains:

"Uncertain

and confused about the full import of their own values,
they fall back upon simpler,

less individualistic, less

ad hoc principles— values that exist, as it were,
t h e r e ’." (Yankelovich,

’out

1981:8)

One would think,

says Yankelovich, that parents

who want their lives to be based on choice, and who want
the same for their children, would not find any common
ground with the Moral Majority.

He hypothesizes that

the answer to this lies in the intrinsically uneasy tension
between the activists in any social movement, and its
broader constituency.

"It is the nature of a social

movement," he says, "that many people can align themselves
with it without supporting the full range of Its
programs."

(Yankelovich,

fairly recent examples.

1981:9)

He cites, for instance,

While the leaders of the student

movement against the Vietnam War generally held a New Left
point of view, the majority of students in the anti-war
movement did not.

Likewise, with the w o m e n ’s movement:

while the general constituency of the w o m e n ’s movement does
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not share the more radical view of the feminist activists,
there is overlap at the edges.

And it is on the basis

of this overlap that has made the w o m e n ’s movement one
of the most influential of our time.

Yankelovich argues

that the same holds true for the Moral Majority and its
sympathizers.

The issue that forges the link between them

is the social climate in which their children are growing
up, even though people do not share the whole program of
the Moral Majority.
The future success of the Moral Majority,
Yankelovich speculates, is partly dependent upon whether
the Right remains the only group strongly addressing the
issue of the "moral welfare" of young people.

If there

is a polarization at the extremes, i.e., total
permissiveness vs. total restrictiveness, the restrictive
faction is likely to win out.

"When people sense that a

situation is out of control, the temptation to fall back
on restrictive measures grows overwhelming."
1981:9)

(Yankelovich,

If the cultural Right is the only voice

expressing concern about the moral climate for children,
and if they are the only ones perceived to be offering
programs to improve such climate, then they will be the
ones to set the agenda.

However, if "a moderate middle

ground can be found, the Moral Majortiy w i l l ... shrink
back to become one of the many minor ideological movements
on the fringes of American life."

(Yankelovich, 1981:9)
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Christian Voice
The Christian Voice is a California-based
lobbying group formed in 1978; its lobbying arm in
Washington, D.C. was established in January, 1979.
Early promotional literature of the Christian Voice
explained the need for their organization:

if Christ

were to return to America today, he would find such
signs of social decay as abortion, homosexuality,
limitation on public school prayer and secular humanism
and evolution being taught in the schools.
1982:70)

(Huntington,

Their literature articulated that Christ would

find:
a government so immoral that it thinks
nothing of betraying Christian allies,
whether in Taiwan or Rhodesia, while
catering in every way possible to
Godless forces of anti-Christ Communism...
a National Council of Churches, which
calls for national redistribution of
wealth (a la Karl Marx) and actively
supports Marxist guerrillas in Africa,
whose preoccupation seems to be the
slaughter of Christian missionaries.
(Huntington, 1982:70)
Christian V o i c e ’s board includes New Right Senators
Orrin Hatch, James McClure, Roger Jepsen and Gordon
Humphrey.

The second largest Christian lobbying group,

it shares computerized mailing lists with Moral Majority.
It seeks to represent in Washington ’’Christian”
positions on issues, and rates legislators on a "morality
scale" according to their stands on homosexuality,
abortion, pornography, prayer in the schools, etc.

It
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then sends these ratings and other materials to its
membership which includes 37,000 clergy from 45 denom
inations and 150,000 lay members.
Crawford,

1980:161-62; Huntington,

(Viguerie, 1981:129;
1982:70)

Criteria for

the "Congressional Report Card" for the 1980 election
was the "correct" vote on 14 "Key Moral Issues", including:
the unionization of teachers (’ag ai nst1);
lifting sanctions on trade with
Muzorewa-dominated Rhodesia ( ’f o r ’);
racial and sexual quotas on school hiring
and school busing (’aga in st ’); and the
Taiwan defense treaty (’f o r ’).
The
correct vote was ’again st’ a $4 million
appropriation for the National Science
Foundation as ’most of these funds
are used to stack the ideological deck
in favor of Godless behavioral humanist
research which contradicts the Christian
viewpoint of m a n k i n d ’s n a t u r e . ’
(Huntington, 1982:70)
Helms, Laxalt and Gordon Humphrey were among those Senators
who received a perfect score of ’1 0 0 ’, as did
Representatives McDonald,

Symms, Hyde and Kemp.

Senators Kennedy, Bayh, Muskie, McGovern, among others,
received a score of ’0 ’ as did Representatives Udall,
Dellums and Kastenmeir.

(Huntington, 1982:70)

Christian V o i c e ’s Chairperson, Reverend Robert
Grant, was one of the founders of American Christian
Cause, which worked in Anita B r y a n t ’s Florida and the
California B r i g g s ’ anti-gay campaigns.

The Washington

office of Christian Voice is headed by Gary Jarmin,
former legislative director of the American Conservative
Union.

David Troxler, former assistant director of the
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Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress,
with the group.

also works

(Conservative D i g e s t , 8/79:15)

Religious Roundtable
The Religious Roundtable, a strategy group formed
in September,

1979, brings together many evangelical and

right-wing organizations.

It was formed by Ed McAteer,

who has a history of w o r k i n g with right- win g political
and Christian groups.

Acco rd ing to the Conservative

D i g e s t , M c At eer is the "contact man in the preachersinto-politics mov ement."

(Conservative D i g e s t , 9/79:17)

He is also national field direct or of the Conservative
Caucus,

press contact for Moral Majority,

m e mbe r of the Wyc li ffe Bible Association.

and a board
He is a close

friend of Adrien Rogers, president of the 13 million
member Southern Baptist Convention.

" M c A t e e r ’s wide spr ead

contacts in the New Right and the Southern Baptist Church",
writes the Conservative D i g e s t , "make him invaluable in
building the pro-family,

pro-God coalition."

(Conservative

D i g e s t , 9/79:17)
The Conservative Digest described the Religious
Roundtable as a "council of 56 conservative members of
the clergy" organized to "coordinate Christian leaders
from around the nation who are willi ng to fight in
the political arena for pro-God, pro-family,
causes."

(Conservative D i g e s t , 9/79:17)

pro-America

The Roundtable

is considered an important part of the new movement of
Christians into conservative politics.

In August,

1980,
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the Religious Roundtable held "national affairs
briefings" which were attended by 15,000 members of the
clergy "who had come to learn the mechanics of organizing
for political action, of creating an awareness of 'their
issues,1 and of promoting these issues within the political
system."

(Ellerin, 1981:62)

The ministers were addressed

by Senators Jesse Helms and John Connolly, Representative
Phillip Crane and Reverends Jerry Falwell and James
Robinson, as well as by Phyllis Schlafly and Paul Weyrich.
Four Keys to Success
"The old right" says Lyn Nofziger, R e a g a n ’s former
Assistant to the President for Political Affairs,
talkers and pamphleteers.
flames as win.

They would as soon go down in

But the New Right has moved toward a more

pragmatic goal of accomplishing things."
The New Right,

"were

(Viguerie, 1981:63)

says Viguerie, has learned "how to recruit,

how to organized and how to successfully market ideas.
For the first time, the American people are hearing the
conservative’s solutions to problems."

(Viguerie, 1981:12)

The New Right has built its success on four elements:
single-issue groups, multi-issue conservative groups,
coalition politics and direct mail.

(Viguerie,

Single-issue groups
Without the single-issue groups which
were already tapping popular sentiment
and activity, the New Right would not
have been able to organize the center

1981:78)
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as it has done.
The single-issue
groups are the soil out of which the
New Right grows. (Hunter, 1981:121)
The independent single-issue groups that emerged in the
late 1960s and 1970s

(e.g. anti-gay, anti-abortion, anti

gun control groups, advocates of restoring prayer in
public schools, groups opposed to sex education, etc.)
have been able to capitalize on the backlash sentiment
against the sixties radicalism and the Great Society.
They have mobilized that group of people who sense a loss
of their own social status, who feel that the culture is
being controlled, more and more, by "new morality"
liber als .
Single-issue groups have often proved decisive
in primary and general elections through their ability
to mobilize votes for or against candidates based on their
stand on any one issue.

Their success has been due, in

large part, to the rise of political action committees
(PACs) with their ample funding, the low voter turnouts
which now typify most elections, and the weakness of the
political parties.

The result, according to one political

analyst, is "single-issue government."

(Crotty, 1980:117)

By reaching out to certain single-issue groups-many of which are very powerful politically, in and of
themselves--the New Right has been able to "promote itself
as the center of a dynamic movement."

(Hunter, 1981:116)

By working with the single-issue groups, the New Right
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is able to work with people and political organizations
who might not be solidly conservative on all issues.
As Paul Weyrich explains i t :
The right-to-life issue has what one
unsympathetic reporter described as a
’symbiotic relationship’ with the New
Right.
Whether they want to or not,
right-to-lifers find they have to work
with New Right activists, simply because
nobody else cares about protecting the
unborn... As circumstances dictate, the
single-interest groups, organized around
anti-busing, tax resistance, defense
issues, parents’ rights, private school
survival, energy self-sufficiency, and
other major problems find they are able
to make common cause with the New Right,
because the New Right is a political
force which shares their concerns on
these issues. (Weyrich, 1982:60)
Although the rise of single-issue groups has
largely been a ’’blessing” for New Right organizers, it
’’has been something of a frustration to them as we ll.”
(Crawford, 1980:34)

Efforts to co-op these groups into

a larger New Right movement have not always been
successful; the Right-to-Life movement, for example,
"while temperamentally related, and overlapping other
New Right groups, have maintained organizational
independence."

(Crawford, 1980:35)

The right-to-lifers

have their own press, their own political action
committees,

even their own political party.

The National

Right to Life Committee, for instance, which claims
10 million members and is the oldest, largest and
most established of the antiabortion organizations,

seeks
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to keep the abortion issue relatively separate from other
social issues.

This has prompted the New Right to set

up competing organizations; e.g. Paul Brown and Judie
Brown head the Life Amendment Political Action Committee
(LAPAC) and the American Life Lobby (ALL), respectively,
and are active members of the New Right leadership network.
(Hunter, 1981:124)
This is not to say, however, that there is not
a great deal of cooperation between autonomous single
issue groups and the primary New Right organizations.
Not only is there cooperation but a significant overlap
in the organizations as well.

And this cooperation has

been significantly furthered through the New R i g h t ’s
ability to organize these different single-issue groups
into a "pro-family" coalition, which will be discussed
further in a later section.
Multi-issue conservative groups
Groups such as the Conservative Caucus, the
American Conservative Union, Committee for the Survival
of a Free Congress, the Heritage Foundation, take a
broad overview on issues, and are consistently conserv
ative on all major issues.

They attempt to cover "all

the bases on all the issues for the conservative
movement" and thus have a smaller constituency than do
the single-issue groups.

(Viguerie, 1981:84)
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The multi-issue movement is led by "generalists
like Paul Weyrich and Howard Phillips, who have well thought
out positions on almost every issue.

These groups are

sensitive to all the elements of the growing conservative
coalition."

(Viguerie, 1981:84)

The leaders of the

multi-issue groups work to build larger coalitions for
the conservative movement.

Says Viguerie,

"When a Right

to Word expert lectures at a Right to Life workshop on
lobbying, i t ’s a safe bet that a conservative movement
leader had a hand in planning the workshop."
1981:85)

(Viguerie,

A large number of organizations, most

important being the single-issue groups, tie into these
core groups and have been brought within the New R i g h t ’s
sphere of influence.

(Hunter, 1981:117)

Leaders of the multi-issue conservative organ
izations meet in regular bi-weekly meetings

(called

"Kingston" meetings for the room where they first met)
to plan strategy, allocate resources, and evaluate ongoing
activities.

It includes more than fifty organizations.

Among its members are representatives from the
Republican Study Committee, the Committee for the
Survival of a Free Congress

(CSFC), Conservative Caucus,

National Association of Manufacturers, American
Conservative Union, National Conservative Political
Action Committee, Conservative Digest and New Right
Report and Congressman Orrin Hatch.

The purpose of the
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group, as stated by Christian Voice, is "the
coordination of efforts among top Washington conservative
groups with regard to current legislation and policy
issues."

(Huntington,

1982:71)

Lisa Wohl, contributing editor to MS. magazine,
comments on the political significance of the New
R i g h t ’s organizational networking, and on how the Left
is lacking in this area:
To envision the way the new right is
organizing, imagine how far along w e ’d
be if a comparable liberal ’Kingston
Gr ou p,’ with organized labor, civil
rights, w o m e n ’s rights, and environ
mentalists— everyone from AFL-CIO
to the welfare mothers— met weekly
to coordinate activities and plan
political strategy. (Wohl, 1979:
94-95)
Coalition Politics
Unlike the old Right, the New Right strongly favors
coalition politics.

New Right conservatives are

making their movement strong and more effective
politically by helping one another on a broad range
of issues by forming ad hoc alliances.

They have formed

ad hoc coalitions around such issues as the Panama Canal,
the Equal Rights Amendment, abortion, pornography,
right-to-work laws, the B-l bomber, welfare, federal
financing of elections, gun control, disarmament,

common

situs picketing, prayer in the schools, Cuba, school
busing to achieve racial desegregation, revision of the
labor law and China.

(Conservative Digest, 1/78:6)
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The New Right will work with any group who agrees
with them— regardless of party line.

Says Viguerie,

We are more than willing to support
Democrats as long as they are
Democrats who are basically right
of center.
I t 1s a matter of simple
arithmetic and common sense...
Coaltion politics includes working
within the Republican and Democratic
parties to nominate conservative
candidates, promote conservative
positions and create conservative
majorities in both parties.
(Viguerie, 1981:87-88)
What it comes down to for the New Right is their belief
in putting ’’principle before party.”

Loyalty to issues

takes precedence over loyalty to political parties.
Liberals,

says Viguerie, have been practicing coalition

politics successfully for years, while "conservatives
limited themselves to the Republican Party.
we were such a small minority."

No wonder

(Viguerie, 1981:87)

Viguerie urges conservatives to get involved in both
parties because they are a "goldmine of opportunity."
They have local, state and national committees, and
Congressional and Senatorial campaign committees which
have "important legal powers, huge spending capabilities,
easy access to news media coverage and are often the
key role in picking who will be the party nominee."
(Viguerie,

1981:89)

And if conservatives can be

influential in picking both nominees, then it does not
matter who wins the election:
Conservatives should work for the day
when the November election is between a
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conservative Democrat and a conservative
Republican.
Then we can go fishing or
play golf on election day knowing that
it d o e s n Tt matter if a Republican or
Democrat wins— i t ’s only important
that a conservative wins. (Viguerie,,
1981:89)
Direct Mail
The media, according to the New Right, is
controlled by the liberal establishment.

As such,

liberals have an easier time getting their views across
to the public, and they are given more publicity by the
press than are conservatives.

Says Viguerie,

a liberal can become a ’leader’ even if
he has never held public office, as the
liberal press will give their own
plenty of free publicity.
Conservatives have equally talented
people but they are seldom heard of because
they have not had massive TV, magazine and
newspaper publicity. (Conservative
D iges t, 3/77:56)
As a result of what they see to be liberal control of the
media, the New Right has developed its own method of
communication— direct mail— at which it excels at and
which the liberal establishment cannot control.

’’You

can think of direct mail as our TV, radio, daily
newspapers and weekly magazines” , says Viguerie.
(Conservative Dige st, 4/77:56)

Without direct mail,

he believes, the conservative movement would "wither and
d i e ."
Direct mail is used not only as a method of fund
raising, but as an organizational tool and as a means
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for propagandizing for the New Right as well.

Direct

mail, outlines Viguerie,

r
o
•
•

helps find the conservatives among
215,000,000 Americans.
informs conservatives as to which battles
must be fought today, this week or this
month.
advises conservatives where conservative
candidates are running, and that they
need our help.
brings the conservative message to tens
of millions of Americans who have never
heard of Conservative Digest, Human E v e nts,
National Review, The Conservative Caucus
or the American Conservative Union.
Those
millions of letters are helping convert
millions of Americans into conservative
activists. (Conservative Digest, 4/77:56)

The New Right and Social Issues
For the past 40 years, conservatives
have stressed almost exclusively economic
and foreign policy.
The New Right shares
the same basic beliefs of other
conservatives in economic and foreign
policy matters, but we feel that
conservatives cannot become the dominant
political force in America until we
stress the issues of concern to ethnic
and blue-collar Americans, born-again
Christians, pro-life Christians and
Jews. (Viguerie, 1981:186)
The issues of concern which Viguerie refers to are
social issues.

The New R i g h t Ts focus on social issues

distinguishes it from the old Right.

Many of the social

issues stressed by the New Right are emotionally-charged
issues such as abortion, homosexuality, busing and gun
control.

’’The most important contribution of the New

Right to the cause of conservatism’’ says New Right
columnist William Rusher,

"is neither theoretical nor
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technical, but emo tio nal ." (Rusher, 1982:23)

(emphasis

added)
It is its focus on social issues which has brought
many social conservatives under the New Right umbrella.
Robert Whitaker,

in his forward to The New Right Papers,

writes:
due attention must be given to the issues
that brought the social conservatives into
the coalition and under the Republican
tent in the first place.
These are, of
course, the so-called ’social issu e s ’—
the entire spectrum of ’pro-fam ily’
issues (right-to-life, opposition to
the constant expansion of ’gay r i g h t s ’,
and general support for the institution
of marriage), pornography, gun-control,
street crime, busing, drug abuse, capital
punishment, etc. (Whitaker, 1982:23)
And correspondingly, through its courting of the single
issue groups which have mobilized around these issues,
the New Right has been able to "reach the new segments
of the population not attracted to the older right-wing
organization."

(Hunter, 1981:121)

The old Right emphasized military and economic
issues and identified its "enemies" as international
communists and labor movements, for their was a backlash
against an earlier period of Left political activity.
Economic conservatism and anticommunism have not diminished
in importance for the Right, but currently it is social
conservatism which is most emphasized by the New Right
and which accounts for its rapid rise to political power
and prominence.

And of all the social issues,

it is
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antifeminist and conservative sexual issues that most
define the New Right's outlook and are at the heart of
the conservative backlash.
1977; Petchesky,

(Hunter, 1981; Gordon and Hunter,

1981; Eisenstein,

1981)

This shift is not surprising given the
weakness of the Left and labor movements
at the present time; whereas the women's
liberation movement in the 1970s had become
the most dynamic force for social change
in the country, the one most directly
threatening not only to conservative
values and interests, but also to
significant groups whose 'way of life'
is challenged by ideas of sexual
liberation. (Petchesky, 1981:211)
There is some debate over the role that racism
plays in the New Right's program.

One view is that the

New Right is not overly racist, but rather "insensitive"
to black people.

Alan Crawford says,

While it would be inaccurate to
attribute overt racism to much of the
New Right, the appeal to fears about
busing and quotas and welfare can
play on racial anxieties.
The
disgruntled Wallaceites who are an
important part of their constituency,
express considerable status insecurity
that for some Americans has a racial
base.
The New Right, at the least, seems
unquestionably insensitive to the interests
of black Americans. (Crawford, 1980:259)
Crawford says that the dominant attitude of the New
Right toward blacks is that expressed by columnist
Patrick J. Buchanan in a column entitled "GOP Vote
Search Should Bypass Ghetto."

In his article, Buchanan

argued that black people have been ungrateful for the
efforts made by Republicans on their behalf.

Republicans
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should stop trying to compete with Democrats for
black votes; after all, they were able to win the White
House in 1968, 1972 and 1980 without them.

(Crawford,

1980:258-59.)
Crawford cites an example that for him dramatized
the New Right's "insensitivity" towards black people.
While serving a stint as Conservative Digest editor,
the staff was preparing to publish an article on Clay
Smothers, a black Wallaceite.

One of the editors

presented the headline for the article:
A BLACK OF A DIFFERENT COLOR.

CLAY SMOTHERS:

Crawford suggested that

Smothers might not be "honored" by the headline and it
was eventually changed to:

A BLACK CONSERVATIVE CHAMPION.

(Crawford, 1980:259)
In an article by Kevin Phillips published in the
Conservative Dig es t, Phillips refers to affirmative
action as "the new racism" and criticizes "minority
fetishism"— i.e. affirmative action,

subsidized housing

for minorities, minority training and rehabilitation,
"minority-oriented educational sociology", etc.

Saying

that "minority fetishism" has cost Americans dearly, he
implies that these minority programs are responsible for
the "decline" of America:

"Coincidentally, perhaps, the

years since 1963-64 have seen the onset of U.S. world
decline."

(Conservative Diges t, 3/78:15)

What makes the New Right

"n e w " is its insistent

emphasis on issues related to the family and sexuality,
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and much of the success of the New Right has been
attributed to its ability to capitalize on these issues.
Antifeminism and conservative sexual issues have been
the defining projects of the New Right.
If there is anything 'new* about the
current right wing in the United States
it is its tendency to locate sexual,
reproductive,, and family issues at the
center of its political program— not
as manipulative rhetoric only, but as
the substantive core of a politics
geared, on a level that outdistances
any previous right-wing movements in
this country, to mobilizing a mass
following.
The politics of the family,
sexuality, and reproduction— and most
directly of abortion— became a primary
vehicle through which right-wing
politicians achieved their ascent to
state power in the late 1970 and the 1980
elections. (Petchesky, 1981:207)
The New Right and the Two-Party System
The New Right, by no means, unreservedly endorses
the Republican Party.

They support conservatives—

whether they be Republicans, Democrats or Independents.
The New R i g h t ’s creed is ideology before party.

This

lack of ’’blind party loyalty” has alienated the New Right
from some Republicans.

The New Right, with its

conservative single-issue groups and Political Action
Committees, has been criticized by Republicans for
draining support away from the GOP.

But the New Right

maintains that, in fact, they help the GOP because a
huge majority of the contributions from their single-issue
groups and Political Action Committees go to Republican
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candidates and helps the Republican Party win elections
and legislative battles.
j^The New Right faults the Republican Party for its
inactivity and its failure to adequately defend the
conservative viewpoint.

In general, there has been

broad dissatisfaction with the Republican Party within
New'Right circlesj

For example, in December,

1979*

William Rusher wrote a piece attacking national Republican
fundraising practices, accusing the GOP of deception in
that it would raise money with conservative slogans and
pledges and then betray those commitments and/or use
the money to support liberal Republicans.

Rusher called

the Republican Party a "net disservice to the cause of
conservatism, the fundamental principles of two-party
politics, and the best interests of the United States."
(Conservative Diges t, 3/79:21)
New Right Senator Paul Laxalt
Nevada)

(Republican-

complained that the Republican Party does not

take clear stands on issues.
[jOne of the deficiencies of the
Republican Party is that it d o e s n ’t
seem to stand for anything.
Our group
does; it takes strong positions...
George Wallace may have been right
when he said there w a s n ’t much difference
between the two parties.^ (Conservative
Dige st, 9/78:47)
Terry Dolan and his National Conservative Political
Action Committee

(NCPAC) involve themselves extensively

in the primaries in part because Dolan distrusts the
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Republican national leadership’s ability to choose or
elect the best conservatives.

Dolan wants to be

personally involved in developing conservative
candidates.

(Conservative Di gest, 1/79:27)

The growth of single-interest groups, which has
benefited the New Right, has created some alarm amongst
political observers on all sides of the political
spectrum.

The rise of single-issue groups has been

blamed for the "fragmentation" of American politics.
(Crotty, 1980:117)

"Uncompromising" single-interest

groups are seen as causing the disintegration of a stable
pattern of politics based on two-party competition.
Alarm has been raised from both Democrats and Republicans.
Common Cause Vice-President, Fred Wertheimer,

in 1978

speculated that in the near future Congress will be
representing PACs instead of consituents.
D iges t, 12/78:18)

(Conservative

^New Right leaders, however, believe

that the Democratic and Republican parties themselves
are responsible for the growth of single-issue groups.
Paul Weyrich maintains that the New Right has not
weakened the two-party system, but rather has simply
stepped into the vacumn created by the existence of an
already-weakened two party s y s t e m J
Had the political parties been providing
these services, particularly the Republican
Party with respect to conservative
candidates, we w o u l d n ’t be competitive.
The parties were weak, we saw that they
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were weak, and we helped to fill the
vacumn. (Conservative Dige st* 12/79:12)
The proliferation of single-issue groups represent
a rebellion against the "tyranny" of the two party
sy s t e m :
No longer do voters have to settle for
the 1lesser of two e vilsT on election day.
Through continued involvement in a political
or social action committee, an individual's
vote on election day becomes more than
just the endorsement of other people's
choices.
People have come to realize
that their deeply held convictions need
not be subjugated to the will of the
party majority* but can be expressed
separately and effectively through
association in a number of issueoriented groups. (Conservative Digest*
12/ 7 8 :18)
JjThe New Right

faults the Democratic and Repub

lican parties for failure to make philosophical
distinctions between themselves* and Paul Weyrich maintains
that as a result* people are going outside the two-party
system in order to address their grievances
I am committed to the two-party system
because I think it is far preferable to
a multi-party system.
The problem is*
we don't have a two-party system.
In
my judgment* we have a one-party system
with two branches* both of which are
more or less committed to the same
kinds of things.
Those of us who have
strong points of view on some issues
don't have an outlet in either political
party.
It is true that we have some people in
each political party who articulate and
are sympathetic to our point of view*
but neither party wants to confront
these issues.
That is why we have all
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these groups springing up throughout
the country; people who feel strongly
no longer have a release within the
political parties.
Rather, they have
had to go out and organize their own
extracurricular activities to influence
the political system. (Conservative
Dig est , 12/79:12)
jjThe political process must be opened up, contends the new
conservative movement,

rather than be shackled to

unresponsive party hierarchies^]

Nathan Muller calls

the proliferation of single-issue groups and the accomp
anying awakened constituency, the "new politics"—
"a widespread perception that government is indeed the
creature of the governed, and that people have the
right, the power, the duty to control its size, cost,
powers, and direction."

(Conservative Digest, 12/78:19)

This "New Politics" which Muller talked of in 1978, and
which would later be termed the "New Populism" stresses
active participation in the political process and a
greater role in the public policy-making sphere.

"In

the midst of a dynamic political movement" says Muller,
"people are demanding accountability from their elected
representatives."

(Conservative Dig est , 12/78:18)

Single-interest groups, Muller contends,

serve as an

additional check on the "awesome powers" of government
and act to curb the "disproportionate" influence of
opposing g r o u p s :
There is nothing to fear from a strong,
centralized government as long as many
factions compete for its favor.
The real

51.
danger to our political system is
having too few, rather than too many
single-interest groups; of burdening
them with more and more regulations
so that only a select few will survive
and wield power and influence.
(Conservative Digest,, 12/78:19)

CHAPTER II
THE 1980 ELECTIONS
Unlike the old Right, the New Right has been
very concerned with winning elections, and culminating
in the 1980 elections they have demonstrated their
success with electoral politics.
By the end of 1979 * the New Right claimed
that 168 members of the House of Rep
resentatives could be counted on to
vote its position on important issues.
According to its own 1979 estimates, a
minimum of 24 U.S. Senators would
predictably vote the New Right line and
six more would probably do so— only
four short of the votes needed to block
treaty ratification, and 11 short of
those required to prevent cloture of a
fillibuster. (Ellerin, 1981:59)
New Right leader Richard Viguerie was confident
that the New Right played a pivotal role both in Reagan's
victory and in the election of a conservative Congress:
Without the New Right, Candidate Ronald
Reagan would have pulled something less
than 50$ of the total popular vote.
...Without the New Right, President Reagan
would have faced a Congress still
dominated by liberal Democrats in both
houses... But with the help of the New
Right, Ronald Reagan sits today in the White
House with a Republican Senate, a much more
conservative House of Representatives, and
an American public who has been sold on
conservative ideas. (Viguerie, 1981:12)
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In the 1980 Senate elections,

four of the five Democratic

Senatorial targets of the National Conservative Political
Action Committee's T,hit list" - Bayh of Indiana,

Culver of

Iowa, McGovern of South Dakota, and Church of Iowa - were
defeated.

Of the seventeen Senatorial and sixteen Congressional

candidates that the New Right supported,

fourteen

candidates won Senate seats and eleven won House seats.
The New Right was also active on the state and local
levels as well.

For example,

in Gainesville, Fla., 42 Moral Majority
candidates ran for virtually all seats open
on the county Democratic Executive Committee
and won.
In California, Moral Majority issued
a survey of attitudes of candidates for
state assembly and senate prior to the
elections.
Of the 28 candidates receiving a
Moral Majority rating of 100 percent, 14 won.
(Ellerin, 1981:55)
The conservative movement came to power through the
vehicle of the 1980 elections,

the New Right maintains,

because liberalism proved it did not work, and because the
conservative movement talked about the issues that people
were concerned about.
maintained,

The 1980 election,

Paul Weyrich

showed that liberalism was "bankrupt" because

it had "gotten out of sync" with the American people.
(Conservative Digest , 7/81:2)

The New Right came of age

in the 1980 elections because it had many advantages over
the Left.
are:

The advantages of the Right, Viguerie outlines

leadership, technology and popular issues:
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The L e f t Ts leadership for the most part...
are now dead or retired or just about to
pass from the political scene.
So, in the
1980s it will be conservatives who have
the leadership in Congress.
The Left d o e s n Tt have the technology
we have.
They d o n ’t have the knowledge of
direct mail, computers, television, radio...
We have about an eight to ten year lead on
the Left in the use of technology, and it's
our challenge to keep that lead.
The liberals don't have the popular
issues.
It's conservatives who can go to
the people with issues that people are
concerned about:
sex on television, abortion,
prayer in school, a strong national defense,
law and order, crime, high taxes. W e ’re the
ones who have the issues that are going to
appeal to the American people in the 1 9 8 0 s .
The people who are going to be interested
in solving the problems with their dollars
and working the precincts are going to be
conservatives.
We have the ability, we have
the issues and it's our challenge to go out
there and get millions of new people involved
in our movement in the next few y e a r s .
(Conservative Dige s t , 2/81:27)
New Right leaders claimed that Reagan's victory
represented a mandate

for conservatism.

Terry Dolan said,

"the election clearly

indicates that Ronald Reagan has

the

biggest mandate any president has received since Franklin
Roosevelt.

To be sure, it is a conservative mandate."

(Conservative Di gest, 11/80:7)

Likewise, Reverend Jerry

Falwell said that the election results represented a mandate
for the'Moral M a j o r i t y ’s conservative principles and that
Reagan had to "produce" on issues such as the Human Life
Amendment.

(Riddiough,

1981:38)

Anti-ERAer Phyllis Schlafly claimed that more
specifically than the New Right,

it was the conservative

pro-family movement that was responsible for nominating
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and electing Ronald Reagan as President in 1980.

Reagan

won, she asserted, because he "rode the rising tides of
the pro-family movement and the conservative movement."
Contending that it was "moral" issues which moved millions
of nonvoters into the polls in 1980, she cited V. Lance
Tarrance Associates, pollster in Houston, Texas, who found
that 21% of nonvoters were born-again Christians and the
two issues which most motivated them were prayer in the
schools and abortion.

His surveys found that about 15#

of nonvoters can be motivated to return to the polls if
they are given sufficient reasons to do so.

It was the

social issues articulated by the pro-family movement,

she

maintains, that spurred millions of nonvoters to vote in
1980 - and they voted for Reagan.
1/81:20-21)

Thus,

(Conservative D i g e s t ,

she maintains, the vote for Reagan

represented a mandate for the Human Life Amendment,

for

prayer in the schools, against affirmative action, against
the Equal Rights Amendment,

against gay rights, etc.

The 1980 election certainly established the New
Right as a credible and viable force in American politics.
Beyond that acknowledgement, however, there exists wide
disagreements over whether a) the New Right played a key
role in the 1980 election,

and b) whether the election

represents a mandate for Reagan and conservatism.
On the first point, New York opinion researcher
Arthur J. Finkelstein, who conducted surveys for NCPAC in
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its target states throught the election,
NCPAC was most heavily involved,
crucial.

found that where

its presence had been

The most important thing that NCPAC did, he contends,

"was set the agenda."

(Keller, 1980:373)

However, pollster

Brian Vargus, who conducts research for Indiana and Purdue
Universities said that their polls showed little familiarity
among those polled with NCPAC slogans.
little focus on issues generally.

They also found

In regards to the Quayle/

Bayh race (in which Bayh, who was on the "hit list", was
defeated), Vargus said:

"It is my impression that the election

of Dan Quayle had virtually nothing to do with issues.
heard it again and again in our polling:
a change.

We

'It is time for

Bayh has been there long enough! ’" (Keller, 1980:3373)

Likewise,

a number of Republican Senators who were

supported by NCPAC and the New Right not only denied that
they were helped by them, but in some cases, argued that
they were even hurt by them.

As the Congressional Quarterly

reported, Republican James Abdnor, who defeated George
McGovern,

filed a complaint with the Federal Election

Commission charging that NCPAC had used his name without
authorization.

His press secretary said that NCPAC probably

did not make any difference in the election.

Charles

Grassley, who defeated John Culver, was said to have felt
the same way.
Church, said,

An aide to Steve Symms, who ousted Frank
"I think if anything,

probably hindered Steve Symms.
of trash."

groups such as NCPAC

I think people got tired

Dan Quayle, who defeated Bayh, appeared on the
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NBC "Today" show a few days after the election and commented
that late in the campaign it appeared that "New Right
groups might cost the Republicans the election" in South
Dakota, Iowa and Idaho.
Lipset and Raab

(Keller,

1980:3372)

(1981) also contend that the impact

of the New Right, and specifically the evangelical religious
Right,

in the 1980 election was overstated.

While NCPAC

claimed credit for the defeat of four of the five targeted
Democratic senators, Lipset and Raab point out that the
decline in the defeated Democratic senat ors ’ votes was
"almost identical with that of the Democratic senatorial
candidates in eighteen non-targeted states in the North.
The average vote for the four liberal Senators fell from
54.5 percent in 1974 to 48 in 1980; the Democratic senatorial
vote in the eighteen other Northern contests declined
from 55 percent to 48."

(Lipset,

1981:29)

They also argue that

the fundamentalist Right did not play a decisive role in
election results.

They noted that a slightly smaller

percentage of born-again white Protestants
than of other white Protestants
voted for Reagan.

(6l percent)

(63 percent) actually

(Lipset, 1981:29)

They also cite

similar conclusions reached by other studies;
Arthur Miller,

for example,

study director of the University of

Michigan's Survey Research Center interviewed 10,000
people, and based on his findings argued that the impact
of fundamentalist groups on the election outcome was much
exaggerated.

Louis Harris also argues that
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the right-wing moralists actually hurt
rather than helped the GOP cause,
since 'the country has moved slightly to
the conservative side in opposing nearly
all new government regulatory measures on
economic matters, but has riot moved at
all to the Right on the social issues
that are such an emotional concern to
the die-hard right-wing conservatives.
(Lipset, 1981:30)
Those who minimize the New Right's role in the 1980
election also point to the fact that there were conservative
victories in states where the New Right was not active,
such as Wisconsin and New York.

They point out further

that there were liberal victories in states on New Right
target lists such as California and Missouri.
argue that the press,
the New Right,

Some also

fascinated with the phenomenon of

"hyped up" the whole affair, thus making

the New Right seem more important than it actually is.
Even pollster Finkelstein, who argued that N C P A C 's role
in the election was crucial,

acknowledged that "a long

run of media attention created these groups as more
important than they were."
Roberts,

(Keller,

1980:3373)

Ronald

field operative for the Republican Campaign

Committee,

said:

A couple of races does not make a trend for the
New Right.
I think it's a nice, easy way
for the press to explain it.
I think it's
really fun for them to have these people on
the morning talk shows and say the whole
game of American politics is changing.
(Keller, 1980:3373)
In regards to the question of whether the election
represented a mandate for Reagan, a close look at the 1980

voting pattern is illuminating.

The voter turnout in

1980 was approximately 53% of the potential electorate,
which is to say that almost one-half of the electorate
chose not to vote.

This marked the fifth consecutive

election that the presidential turnout has declined.

It

was a full percentage point below the 1976 turnout rate
of 54.4 percent and was the lowest turnout since 1948.

Of

the eligible voters, Reagan polled 27% to Carter's 22%;
a record 7 1/2 million people voted outside the two-party
system.

Of the potential electorate, then, approximately

one-fourth voted for Reagan; three-fourths did not.
Reagan's 27% of the potential electorate compares to
Johnson's 38% in 1964, Nixon's 34% in 1972 and Carter's
27% in 1976.

(Eisenstein,

1981:189; Hall, 1981:2-3)

Many political analysts and observers saw the 1980
Reagan victory less as an endorsement of Reagan and rightwing ideology and more as a rejection of Carter.

The

New York Times and CBS conducted an "exit poll" the day of
the election - a detailed survey in which they polled
12,782 people as they left the polls.

Reagan supporters

indicated anti-Carter sentiment as the main reason they
voted for Reagan.

Only 11% voted for Reagan because they

regarded him as a "conservative” , while 38% voted for
Reagan, not for ideological reasons, but because they said
it was "time for a change."

The same poll showed that

one out of every five voters changed their minds about
the candidate of their choice in the last five days before
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the election,

indicating that they were not deeply

committed to the programs or candidates of the two
major parties.

(Eisenstein, 1981:189-90)

ABC News also conducted an exit poll and found
similar results.

Their findings also suggested

dissatisfaction with Carter as the main reason people
voted for Reagan.

Their news release commented:

It is clear from the ABC poll of 11,250
voters that questions about Carter's
economic policies, his handling of the
Iran hostage situation, and his overall
leadership caused many traditional
Democrats— at the last moment— to vote
for Reagan.
Other Democrats, unwilling
to vote for Carter, opted for Reagan by
staying home. (Douglas, 1981:181)
ABC asked voters how they would have voted if the choice
had been between Carter and John Anderson, who was viewed
as more liberal than Carter, and thus ideologically near
the opposite end of the political spectrum from Reagan.
Anderson won, leading the ABC pollsters to conclude that
"for many voters, it was an anybody but Carter affair."
(Douglas,

1 9 8 1 :181)

The 1980 elections took place in the wake of
widespread voter frustration and a desire for "change."
Michael Kazon, editor of Socialist Review argues that
many voters chose Reagan and ousted key liberal Democratic
Senators out of office because of their "anger at the
patent failures of policy-makers."

"Their discontent is

volatile", he said, and "tends to be directed against
incumbents, of whatever political stripe."

(Kazin, 1981:8)
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Economist Jim Campen echoes the same thought:

Carter and

the Democrats lost in 1980 because they seemed unable to
do anything at all about the nation's ever-mounting economic
problems.

And in our two-party system, notes Campen,

"hard times generally result in electoral defeat for the
party in office."

(Campen, 1981:33)

In 1980 there

was growing national frustration at the

country's worsening economic conditions and "loss of prestige"
abroad.

Rising unemployment, real wages falling, record

high interest rates, and double-digit inflation all served
to create a pro-change sentiment among voters.
Iranian hostage crisis,

for many,

And the

symbolized America's

weakened position internationally,

and served to focus

voter discontent on America's problems.

GOP consultant

Lance Tarrance noted that "Reagan was a symbol of pro-change
sentiment."

(Keller,

1980:3370)

In rejecting Carter,

voters for the second consecutive election
turned their backs on an embattled incumbent
to elect a challenger promising a fresh
approach to government and a dynamic new
brand of leadership. (Cook, 1980:3296)
The defection of many Democratic blue-collar workers
to Reagan in 1980 was one of the keys to the Republican
victory.

Whereas Carter received 56% of the blue-collar

vote in 1976,

in 1980 he received only 46%.

(Pierce, 1980:1877)

During the campaign, Reagan pounded away at Carter's failures
in dealing with the economy, and was thus able to successfully
court a significant share of the traditionally Democratic
blue-collar vote.

His support from this group was also
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strengthened by his appeal to their social conservatism,
and he made every effort to do so because the "social issue
lies at the hiatus between the liberals and the workingclass Democrats."

(McWilliams,

1981:274)

During the

campaign Reagan put forth a "supply-side" economic doctrine
and argued that dismantling government regulation and
reducing taxes and spending would spur economic growth
and create jobs.
Supply-side seemed to lift the contradiction
between laissez-faire economics and popular
welfare.
It gave Republicans a way of
appealing to the blue-collar Democrats as
well as to country-club Republicans.
(Judis, 1983:23)
Sociologist Todd Gitlin argues that Carter "bumbled"
so badly that many traditional Democrats would have voted
for any opponent who was not "conspicuously foaming at
the mouth."

Given this situation,

said Gitlin, all Reagan

needed to do was convince the undecided that he did not
have an "itchy nuclear trigger finger."

(Gitlin,

1981:68-69)

Apparently the October 28, 1980 presidential debate went
a long way towards accomplishing that purpose.

Reagan's

"affable performance in the nationally te lev ise d... debate
seemed to take much of the steam out of the Carter assault"
that Reagan was a right-winger and a threat to world peace.
(Cook,

1980:3297)

In fact, a variety of public opinion polls

showed an unusually large number of undecided voters in
the final weeks of the campaign.

Apparently many voters

reconciled themselves to Reagan as a result of the debate.
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The New York Times/CBS exit poll showed that 10% of the
people who voted for Reagan gave as their reason: He
"impressed me during the debates."

(Pierce, 1980:1877)

While it was the articulation of social issues
which largely identified the New Right and which clearly
distinguished the Republican Party Platform from the
Democratic Party Platform,

it appears that most people

voted on issues related to the economy.

In the same

New York Times/CBS poll, it was found that people voted
mostly on economic issues rather than on values,
styles or social issues.

life

40% of Reagan supporters polled

chose "inflation and economy" as the issues that led them
to vote for Reagan, while only 5% chose ERA/abortion.
(Pierce, 1980:1877)

These findings prompted Eleanor

Smeal, President of the National Organization of Women
(NOW) to remark:

"While people were voting on issues of

the economy and foreign policy, the results will be paid
for by the women's movement."

(Riddiough, 1981:38)

It was social issues, and primarily issues related
to women's rights and reproduction (the Equal Rights
Amendment and abortion), which most clearly distinguished
the Republican and Democratic Party platforms from one
another.

The Republican Party, while stating its

support for women's rights, opposed ratification of the
Equal Rights Amendment, opposed abortion, and embraced
the values of the traditional family:
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We reaffirm our belief in the traditional
role and values of the family in our society...
we affirm our support of a constitutional
amendment to restore protection of the right
to life for unborn children.
We also support
the Congressional efforts to restrict the use
of taxpaye rs’ dollars for abortion...We express
our support for legislation protecting and
defending the traditional American family
against the ongoing erosion of its base in
our society.
We protest the Supreme C o u r t ’s
intrusion into the family structure through
its denial of the parents' obligation and
right to guide their minor children.
(reprinted in Congressional Quarterly Almanac
1980, Vol. XXXVI:61B-64B)
In contrast,

the Democratic Party platform expressed its

support for the Equal Rights Amendment, supported reproductive
freedom (including abortion rights),
Amendment,

opposed the Hyde

and recognized the family in its ’’diverse forms.”

In addition to stating its support for ratification of
the Equal Rights Amendment,

it stated:

The Democratic Party shall withold financial
support and technical campaign assistance
from candidates who do not support the E.R.A.
The Democratic Party supports the 1973 Supreme
Court decision on abortion rights as the law
of the land and opposes any constitutional
amendment to restrict or overturn that
deci s ion... The Democratic Party recognizes
reproductive freedom as a fundamental human
right.
We therefore oppose government
interference in the reproductive decisions of
Americans, especially those governmental
programs or legislative restrictions that
deny poor Americans their right to privacy
by funding or advocating one or a limited
number of reporductive choices only...
the Democratic Party supports efforts to make
federal programs more sensitive to the needs
of the family, in all its diverse forms.
(reprinted in Congressional Quarterly Almanac
1980, Vol. XXXVI:97B-105B)
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However, on issues related, to the economy and defense,
the platforms were more similar than they were different.
"Both platforms share the analysis that government has
grown too big in the social service areas and had
become too small in defense-related activities."
(Eisenstein, 1981:194-95)
Eisenstein argues that although a " ’pro-f ami ly’,
antifeminist" politics was central to R e a g a n ’s platform
and therefore the election because it helped "mobilize
key segments of voters", R e a g a n ’s victory cannot be read
as an unambiguous endorsement of antifeminism (Eisenstein,
1981:188) as Phyllis Schlafly previously argued.

First

of all, most people did not vote on "feminist" issues,
but rather on issues related to the economy.

In fact,

many supporters of the Equal Rights Amendment voted for
Reagan.

Since Reagan does not support the Amendment,

evidently these voters voted on other issues, as the exit
polls indicated.

While a higher percentage of ERA

supporters went for Carter,
(Pierce, 1980:1876)

33% of them voted for Reagan.

Although their concern for w o m e n ’s

rights was evidently overshadowed by their concern for
the economy, their support of Reagan did not include an
endorsement of his anti-ERA stand.
Further, as Eisenstein points out, those who
rejected the antifeminist policies of the Republicans and
the N e w .R i g h t , "had no significant way of voicing this
opinion.

Those who wanted an alternative to conservatism
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and antifemism did not feel they could find it in
Carter."

(Eisenstein,

1981:188)

While Carter ’s support

of women's rights on the rhetorical and ideological level
was evident, his actual record was less than impressive.
For example, he fired Bella Abzug as co-chair of the
National Advisory Committee on Women, his Administration
banned medicaid abortions, and his $16 billion slash in
domestic spending hit women the hardest since women
constitute a majority of the poor, the low wage-earners
and welfare recipients.

The National Organization of

Women, which represents the "mainstream" or "liberal"
tenet of American feminism, recognized that the difference
between the two parties operated more on the level of
ideology than substance.

They refused to endorse Carter’s

candidacy and actively campaigned against the New Right
forces in the Reagan campaign.

(Eisenstein,

1981:198;

Douglas, 1981:177)
The Reagan victory reflected a "small, highly
mobilized and organized section of the electorate along
side a much larger, disorganized, disenfranchised public
which did not vote."

(Eisenstein,

1981:188)

As recent voting studies have shown, the
relative electoral universe is contracting
as disproportionate numbers of minority,
low-wage, young and female voters become
permanent abstentionists. Meanwhile, the
intensity of participation by middleand high-income brackets has sharply
increased.
Thus the ’greening' of
American politics effectively disenfranchises
the poor, while simultaneously ensuring
that the new activism of the middle classes
will act as a ventriloquism for
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the voices of corporate PACs and New
Right lobbies. (Davis, 1981:46)
There is some evidence to suggest that Ttfeminists11 (roughly
defined as one who supports the Equal Rights Amendment and
abortion rights) voted in smaller numbers in the 1980
election than did "non-feminists11 (roughly defined as one
who does not support the Equal Rights Amendment or abortion
rights).

A Gallup poll conducted around the time of the

election showed that support for ERA and reproductive
rights outweighed opposition by at least two to one.
64% of those polled favored ERA;

33% opposed.

65% opposed

a ban on abortion, while 31% favored such a ban.
only 46% of voters expressed support for ERA.
1981:52)

However,

(Riddiough,

Riddiough concludes that Mantifeminists were

far better able to get out the votes than were feminists."
(Riddiough, 1981:43)
While acknowledging that the election of

1980

placed anti-feminist forces into offices of' power in the
government, Eisenstein contends that the election does not
represent a similar shift to antifeminist politics on the
part of the general public:
By pointing out the small number of people
who voted for Reagan as a conservative, I
do not mean that these small numbers are
insignificant.
Rather, they reflect the
well-mobilized New Right which represents
an enormous danger in that it both instigates
and endorses the movement of the state to
the right.
Nevertheless, it is important
to put their political clout in the perspective
of the American public in general...
Although Reagan's election represents a victory
for antifeminist forces within the state, the

68.
greater part of the American people,
I believe, can be described as
'feminist1, if feminism is defined
as the mainstream politics of liberal
feminism. (Eisenstein, 1981:188)
She notes that polls have consistently shown majority
support for abortion rights and the Equal Rights
Amendment, and contends that "liberal values of
individual rights and freedom of choice" underlie
this support.

(Eisenstein, 1981:197)

As Steinfels

(1979)

writes in The Neo-Conservatives, the American public is
commited to liberal values:

"They are Americans, and

Americans are optimistic liberals.

That is,

'equality,

no matter how abused or disused', has always been the
prevailing American norm."

(Steinfels, 1979:221)

CHAPTER III
THE PRO-FAMILY COALITION
We will work in Washington, in state
capitols, in cities and towns, in schools
and churches, everywhere that is necessary,
to protect and preserve the American
family as it has developed and evolved
during our countr y’s 200 year history.
(Viguerie, 198l:l6l)
The Conservative Digest claims that "no political
movement in America
vast a

today has the potential to reach as

constituency as the pro-family

movement,

forthis

movement talks about issues that directly and emotionally
affect tens of millions of Americans."
movement

The pro-family

’’could be enough to turn America around.

This

could be the most exciting political story of the next
decade."

(Conservative Digest, 8/79:16)

Recognizing the importance of family issues to the
1980s, the New Right has worked hard both in bringing
these issues to the forefront,
them.

and in "controlling"

Much of the Right's rise to power stems from its

successful appropriation of the "family" - from "its
ability to portray itself as the only social force concerned
with

’family v a l u e s , ’ while depicting feminists as

antifamily."

(Block, 1981:269)
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Perhaps more than any other New Right leader,
Paul Weyrich has stressed the political importance of
the pro-family movement.

He has stated that what the

Vietnam War was to the sixties, and environmental and
consumer issues were to the seventies,
be to the eighties.

family issues will

(Conservative Di gest, 8/79:18)

Weyrich

says that it became clear to him that a shift was underway
to focus national debate on a new set of issues when think
tanks everywhere began doing family-type studies, and when
conferences like the International W o m e n ’s Year and the
Year of the Child were held under federal sponsorship.
And coinciding with these developments, Weyrich notes, were
the decline of the mainline churches in their
mission of preaching the gospel, and the
formation of single-issue groups on homosexual
rights, abortion rights, and so on.
All of
these converged, in my opinion, right at the
end of the decade, to make it clear that
lifestyle and family issues are going to be a
major focus of the 1980s. (Conservative Digest,
5/80:14-15)
While acknowledging that the issues of the economy and
national defense will continue to be areas of concern and
focus for people, they will, Weyrich argues, be tied to the
family issue:
Now there will be other focus es. The economy
will definitely be one, as will national
defense.
But even economic questions are
linked to family questions.
If the family
cannot survive without both parents working
or getting federal welfare, there are all
sorts of long-range implications for preservation
of the family.
These issues d o n ’t necessarily
break down along traditional liberal-conservative
lines, and so there is going to be a certain
amount of political realignment. (Conservative
Digest, 5/80:15)
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The working relationship between the religious
Right and the secular New Right, and between the single
issue groups and the primary New Right organizations
have been enhanced by
the decision in 1977 to place groups devoted
to preservation of the traditional social
roles of the family, the churches and the
schools - which are the generalized concerns
of the antiabortion, antibusing, anti-Equal
Rights Amendment, and anti-gay constituencies under the more inclusive rubric of the
’pro- fam ily ’ movement. (Crawford, 1980:27)
Pro-family leaders organized the "Library Court"

(named

after the street on Capitol Hill where the original meeting
place was located) in Washington, D.C.
1979.

in the summer of

The Library Court is a fairly close-knit coalition

of over twenty nationwide pro-family groups whose leaders
meet a couple of times a month to discuss tactics and
strategy.

(Hunter, 1981:119)

A major project of Library

Court is the Legislative Exchange Action Force

(LEAF)

which alerts pro-family groups through a phone bank
operation when immediate action is needed on an issue.
(Conservative Digest,

7/81:8)

Context for Emergence of the Pro-Family Movement
The pro-family movement is an outgrowth of the
anti-gay, anti-abortion, anti-feminist movements.

Through

the use of moral imagery, the pro-family movement has
linked the issues of feminism,

gay and lesbian rights,

and abortion as destructive to the family unit, and thus
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destructive to society.
In The Politics of Unreason (1970), Lipset and
Raab say that extreme right-wing movements, which are
characteristically expressions of "preservatist" impulses
by social groups who feel their "way of life" is
threatened, rely heavily on moralism.
Desperately preservatist or restorative
movements— that is backlash movements—
require an aggressively moralistic stance
and will find it somewhere.
There needs
to be invoked some system of good and
evil which transcends the political or
social process and freezes it. (Lipset,
1 9 7 0 :117)
This system of good and evil invoked by the New Right,
however,

is not arbitrary; it is a "product of the

particular historical moment and of a conjunction of
material and social forces that bring specific social
conflicts to the fore."

(Petchesky, 1981:211)

In other

words, argues Petchesky, the embodiment of evil for the
Right in this period of time is feminism and homosexuality,
both of which represent movements for "transcendance of
a patriarchal form of family and for sexual liberation."
(Petchesky,

1981:211)

Alan Crawford places the New Right within an
historical perspective in characterizing the New Right
as a backlash movement.

Backlash groups arise, in part,

as a response to feelings that society has withdrawn
its approval from the values they uphold.

Status

resentment occurs when groups perceive that their
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prestige in society is threatened by the upward
mobility of groups traditionally below them on the
social ladder, and when their values and way of life
are not afforded the social support and respect they
once commanded.

(Crawford,

1980:148-9)

Traditional forms of authority and domination
have been deeply challenged over the last twenty years.
The twentieth century experience, writes Bill Resnick,
staff member of the Socialist Review journal, has been
an "uneven but continuous democratic surge, a
strengthening of subordinate groups and weakening of
established authority."

(Resnick, 1981:22)

This process

has
disrupted every area of social life
and every core institution— resulting
in discipline problems in workplace
and schools, an unreliable army,
fragmented political parties, and
stalemated government, parent/child
conflict, great distress among both
men and women around family and
sex. (Resnick, 1981:22)
Issues related to the family— sexual mores, family
structure, male/female relationships, etc.— have
particularly undergone tremendous changes in the past
two decades.

The structure of the family itself has

undergone dramatic changes.

By 1977, three-fourths of

all married women were working outside the home, as well
as over one-half of those with school-age children.
out of three marriages end in divorce.

One

The fertility rate
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has reached its lowest point in this country’s
history, reflecting a reduction in average family size.
By 1977., one out of seven households in the United
States was headed by a single woman.

One out of five

Americans live alone, that is, not in a "family.11
Over one million households consist of unmarried couples.
(Petchesky,

1981:235-36)

In his book, New Rules, cultural analyst Daniel
Yankelovich sees our society going through adjustments
not unlike the geological folding and faulting of plate
tectonics, when there is a shift in the "giant plates
that undergird the e a r t h ’s surface and keep it stable
and rigid."

(Yankelovich, 1981:57)

The p u b l i c ’s

understanding of w o m e n ’s role, and w o m e n ’s view of
themselves, has undergone such a major shift.

It is

the reaction against the changing views of women,
sexual relationships, and the family structure which
accounts, perhaps as much or more than anything else,
for the rise of the pro-family movement specifically,
and the New Right generally.
easy for a n y o n e .

These changes have not been

Change often threatens.

And changes

which touch on p e o p l e ’s view of themselves or others,
or changes which touch people where they are often
their most vulnerable— their sexuality— can threaten
deeply.
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These are changes whose major upswing has
occurred only during the last twenty years,
less than one generation, and whose impact
on p e o p l e ’s lives and expectations for
themselves and their children has undoubtedly
been intense and unsettling.
Absorbing
that impact has been difficult for all
people, including comitted feminists, who
believe strongly in the need for divorce,
birth control, and sexual freedom.
For
those persons whose belief has remained
unshaken in their prerogative, as a man
to ’have the authority and make the
d eci s i o n , ' or their privilege, as a woman,
’to be happy with i t ’ - it must seem a very
alien and treacherous world. (Petchesky, 1981:236)
Feminists and others on the Left have tended to view these
changes in a positive light, while acknowledging, nevertheless
that the changes are often difficult.

However, the New

Right has not perceived these changes as "a breakthrough
in human consciousness but as a threat to stable patterns."
(Wall, 1982:499)

New Right/Pro-Family Ideology
The Family
Over and over again, the theme that runs
throughout New Right literature on the family is the
belief that a "strong family" is the basis for a "strong
America."

Falwell says,

"No nation has ever been

stronger than the families within her", and "the strength
and stability of families determine the vitality and
moral life of society."

(Falwell, 1980:121,123)

Senator Jesse Helms says,

"We must restore and preserve

the family as the focus of our personal and social
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well-being and the strongest defense we have against
the totalitarian state.” (Falwell, 1980:137)

A strong

family Is the foundation of a strong society.

Weaken

the institution of the family and the entire fabric of
society is weakened.

Educational consultant to the

Heritage Foundation, Dr. Onalee McGraw says,

"The

recovery of the family is nothing less than the
recovery of our common humanity."

(Conservative Digest,

3/ 8 1 :28 )
The New R i g h t ’s definition of the family is
limited to that of the traditional nuclear family—
father, mother, and biological or adopted children.
A broader definition of family, which would embrace
alternative lifestyles, does not figure in the New
R i g h t ’s concept of that term.

As New Rightist Clyde

Wilson expressed it, "Alternative lifestyles do not
constitute emancipation and progress, they constitute
malignancy."

(Wilson, 1982:121)

Jerry Falwell decried

the fact that at the White House Conference on Families
held in June and July of 1980, the family was eventually
defined as any persons living together who share
resources, responsibility for decisions, values and
goals, and have a commitment to one another over time.
As Falwell noted, this definition would include
homosexual men, lesbian women, and other people living
together under the same roof.

This definition, according

to conference participants, better reflected the
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existing differences in family structure and lifestyles.
But Falwell does not accept this new definition:
When a man and woman come to a marriage
altar and are legally and spiritually
united, a family has been born.
When
children are born or adopted into that
union the family is being enlarged.
And
that is simply what a family is.
You
cannot recreate what God has established.
God did not make a mistake when He created
Adam and Eve and brought them together to
become one flesh. (Falwell., 1980:133-34)
And when delegates at the Conference endorsed the right
to abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, nondiscrimination
against homosexuals, national health insurance and a
guaranteed annual income of $13^000 for a family of
four, many of the pro-family coalition members walked
out of the meeting in protest.
V i g u e r i e ’s words,

They refused,

in

"to be part of such a Big Brother

approach to the problems of the American family."
(Viguerie, 1981:158)
The family, In the New Right view, is strictly
relegated to the dictates of God.
as Falwell says,

God made the family;

"The home was the first institution

established by God."

(Falwell,

a natural unit; it is timeless;

1980:1-2)

The family is

it is ahistorical.

In

contrast to the New R i g h t ’s view that the family is a
"natural biological unit", an entity that exists
essentially outside of history, feminists and other
progressives contend that the traditional family is:

a social, economic, political and
cultural unit of a society.
It is
historical in its formation, not a
simple biological unit.
Like w o m e n ’s
roles, the family is not ’nat ural’ :
it reflects particular relations of
the society, particular needs to
be filled. (Eisenstein, 1979:48)
The religious Right takes the lead in extolling
the virtues of the family and in identifying and opposing
those elements which pose
threat to the family:

, in their view, the biggest

feminism, homosexuality and abortion.

"It is now time" writes Falwell,

"to take a stand on

certain moral issues. We must stand against the Equal
Rights Amendment, the feminist revolution, and the
homosexual revolution."

(Falwell, 1980:19)

Opposition

to these issues all become "moral" issues mandated by
the teachings of the Bible— teachings often according
to the interpretations of Falwell and other fundamentalist
preachers.
Like all conservative movements, the pro-family
movement seeks to strengthen "authority"— especially
the authority of parents over their children and husbands
over their wives.

The necessity of authority and

submission to authority are themes that run strong in
pro-family literature, and they are often justified by
Biblical teachings.

"As a family, they Qnan and woman^J

are in submission to the Lordship of Jesus Christ."
(Falwell,

1980:122)

And from that primary relationship

to Christ, a natural hierarchy follows:

women are to be
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subordinate to their husbands, and children to their
parents.

In the Christian home, wives are to be

submissive to their husbands.
The New Right wants to strengthen the family,
but their concept of the family does not include the
plurality of forms of personal life that feminists and
other progressives intend by that Concept.

While the

latter embrace a diversity of family relationships which
would include couples living or not living together,
homosexual and lesbian relationships,
extended kin groups,

single parenthood,

communal living arrangements, etc.,

the New R i g h t ’s definition of the family is strictly
limited to the traditional family.

And yet, as has

been noted, the type of family the New Right would like
to restore and strengthen— and through legislation such
as the Family Protection Act, impose on those who do not
conform to it— has been becoming less and less the norm
in America.
Central to the New Right world view is the
nuclear family as its basic social unit.

The model of

the New Right family is decidedly married and heterosexual
and it espouses a very traditional view of women and
f ami lies.
New Right leaders envision a world whereby
’f a m i l y ’ means a male bread-winner, a
female homemaker and two or three reverent
children.
Family relationships are to be
understood by rigidly defined sex roles that
subordinate women as wives and mothers in the
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domestic sphere.
Women are passive,
dependent, self-sacrificing and evernurturing; men are the undisputed
heads of the household— authoritarian,
aggressive, individualist and in total
control of their property (i.e. their
wives and children). In addition, New
Right philosophy supports very
conservative sexual values, putting
forth a restricted and unhealthy model
of female sexuality.
Sex is only
appropriate within a heterosexual
marriage, and then only for procreation.
The suppression of teenage sexuality
also part of their moral code.
This
view of sex roles and sexual repression
demands that women know their places
and stay there. (Cole, 1981:7)
Abortion
While the pro-family movement has been the
cutting edge of the New Right politics, abortion is
the issue on which the New Right has primarily
consolidated its power thus far.

Many political observers

consider the anti-abortionists to be the politically most
successful of the single-issue groups.

(Crotty, 1980:1*10)

Antiabortion ideology often becomes the basis
for a much broader program to restore conservative
ideas and practices regarding the family and sexuality.
"What the right-to-life movement has managed to put
together on the abortion issue is only a sample of what
is to come when the full range of family and education
issues becomes the focus of debate in the 1980s," says
Paul Weyrich.

(Conservative Digest,

8/79:18)
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New Right antiabortion groups such as the American
Life Lobby* the Life Amendment Political Action
Committee and the National Pro-Life Committee are closely
linked through interlocking directorates with New Right
political groups such as the American Conservative
Union* Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress*
and Conservative Caucus.

They share supplies* people*

money and organizations. (Symmer* 1981:39)

Viguerie*

Weyrich* Phillips and most of the congressional Right
have all occupied leadership positions on anti-abortion
political action committees.

(Oliker* 1981:81)

Women who favor abortion are viewed as selfish;
they are saying that "self-satisfaction is more important
than the family."

(Falwell* 1980:124)

The fear of

w o m e n Ts "right to choose"* argues Stacey Oliker* runs
deep in right-to-lifers:
Henry H y d e Ts warnings that mothers have
become the adversaries of their
children* for example* speaks to deep
fears of the effect of w o m e n ’s liberation
on w o m e n ’s commitments to nurture and
sacrifice for their children and
husbands.
W o n ’t exposing the often
conflicting interests of women and
children* and empowering women to ’c h oose’
be the end of maternal altruism?
Ken* children and women* too* look to
women for nurturance and sacrifice.
Abortion evokes the fear that if women
can choose* w o n ’t they choose over
and over again ’not t o ’? (Oliker* 1981:85)
Under the banner of "protecting the fetuses*"
New Right/pro-family antiabortion forces have waged a
well-financed* well-organized assault on abortion
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rights.

Closer examination shows that opposition to

abortion often has more to do with fear of w o m e n ’s
independence,

sexual liberation, declining parental

authority, and marital and familial instability than it
does with concern for protecting the fetus.
The contemporary antiabortion movement
arose in response neither to the
existence of abortions nor to an increase
in their number.
It arose in response
to the legalization of abortion.
It is
this legitimation, more than the act of
abortion itself, that threatens
traditional social and sexual values...
Opposition to abortion is part of a
larger opposition to changes in family
relations, sexual mores, and the status
of women. (Hunter, 1981:132)
The Quixote Center, a Catholic community based in
Washington, D.C., conducted a study of Catholics opposed
to abortion and found that many in the movement saw
abortion at the deepest psychological level "less as a
taking of a human life than as a practice threatening to
existing social patterns and customs in families,
marriages, and sexual relations.” (Wohl, 1979-58-59)
Dr. J.C. Wilke, president of the National Right to Life
Committee, articulated the fear that abortion rights
threaten the authority of the husband when he stated
that abortion rights ”do violence to marriage by helping
to remove the right of a husband to protect the life of
the child he has fathered in his w i f e ’s womb."
1981:221)

(Petchesky,
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Abortion rights strike a blow at the natural unity
of sex, procreation, and the family.

Dr. Bernard

Nathanson, cofounder of the National Association for
Repeal of Abortion laws alluded to this concern in his
criticism of earlier Supreme Court decisions which in
1976 threw out statutes in Missouri requiring a h u s b a n d ’s
consent for abortion, and in 1979 threw out the
Massachusetts law that required parental consultation
or notification:
The state, through the decree of the
Supreme Court, has become a willing
party to the dissolution of the family
on the consent question.
On abortion,
it has taken an adversary position on the
formation of new families.
And it
takes an adversary position against
the family as the stabilizing unit within
society.
Pregnancy and childbirth are
cohesive in their effect on the family,
while sex, apart from the family and
childbearing, is never socially cohesive;
on the contrary, it is a chaotic
force. (Falwell, 1980:172)
Some pro-family forces also fear that the
legalization of abortion, and its increasing
legitimation, will lead to genetic manipulation,
infanticide, and euthanasia.

Dr. Mildred Jefferson,

speaking of F a l w e l l ’s "Old-Time Gospel Hour"
articulated this fear:
Today it is the unborn child; tomorrow
it is likely to be the elderly or
those who are incurably ill.
Who
knows but that a little later it may
be anyone who has political or moral
views that do not fit into the
distorted new order. (Falwell, 1980:17*0

84.
Opposition to abortion is also based on the loss of
parental control over teenage sexual activity, and the
desire to prevent such activity.

The question of

whether a parent has the right to force an unwanted
pregnancy on a teenager is "submerged in a cry of
despair over parental powerlessness and merged with a
politics of opposing all state intervention into family
matters."

(Oliker, 1981:85)

Of all the feminist demands, it is abortion
which is viewed by the New Right as most threatening
to the traditional form of family and to conservative
sexual values.

Abortion rights have come to be

recognized by advocates and foes alike as a "paradigmatic
feminist demand."

(Petchesky,

1981:210)

Historically,

the control of women is linked to growths in right-wing
influence and power.

(Cooper, 1981:39)

Feminists view

abortion rights as a fundamental requirement for w o m e n ’s
liberation, and now more than ever, an uncompromisable
demand since abortion has become "a wedge for the
broader right-wing attack."

(Oliker, 1981:90)

Homosexuality
In the New Right view, homosexuality represents
an immoral lifestyle; it results from a loosening of sex
roles and is reflective of a general degeneration in the
morals and values of a society.

For the religious

Right, it is, quite simply, a sin.

"The sin of
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homosexuality is so grievous,

so abominable in the sight

of God, that He destroyed the cities of Sodom and
Gomorrah because of this terrible sin."

(Falwell, 1 9 8 0 :l8l)

According to Falwell, homosexual men and lesbian women
have not accepted their God-given roles as "man" and
"woman", and thus we have this present moral crisis.
He calls homosexuality "Sat an’s diabolical attack upon
the family."

(Falwell, 1980:183)

Homosexuality results

from the absence of strong male leadership in the
family, and correspondingly, from too much female
influence.

Referring to the feminist movement as

"unisexual", Falwell says that it has contributed to
the growth of homosexuality by challenging rigid sex
roles.

Feminists desire to "eliminate God-given

differences that exist between the sexes; that is why
they are prohomosexual and lesbian."

(Falwell, 1980:185)

The pro-family movement opposes gay rights.
Anita Bryant sparked a nation-wide movement against
homosexuality called "Save Our Children,

Inc." in

1977 when she led the crusade in Dade County, Florida
to repeal a gay rights ordinance banning discrimination
in employment and housing based on a p e r s o n ’s sexual
preference.

In the wake of B r yant’s Dade County victory

came six other anti-gay victories, and Save Our
Children,

Inc. was involved in each of the campaigns.

(Crawford, 1980:152-53)

Anti-gay activists are

particularly opposed to the employment of gay teachers

because they feel the teaching of traditional sex roles
is essential to the survival of the traditional nuclear
family, and that gay teachers will initiate students
into a homosexual lifestyle.

The following letter from

Save Our Children, Inc., underlined in red and signed
by Anita Bryant illustrates the appeals to fear and
anger that characterizes many New Right fundraising
letters:
When the homosexuals burn the Holy Bible
in p u b l i c ...
how can I stand by silently.
Dear Friend:
I d o n ’t hate the homosexuals!
But as a mother I must protect my children
from their evil i nflu enc e.
...Do you realize what they want?
They want to recruit our school children
under the protection of the laws of our l a n d !
(reproduced in Crawford, 1980:52)
The New Right fears that the gay rights movement
will lead to civil rights for homosexuals which will
result in homosexuality increasingly being viewed as an
acceptable,

albeit alternative, lifestyle.

Says Falwell

...there is a movement for legislation
that would deem homosexuals as ’n o r m a l . ’
Homosexuality is now presented as an
alternative life style.
Hundreds of
thousands of men and women in America
flagrantly boast their sin and march in
public view.
They are an indictment
against America and are contributing
to her downfall... . The homosexual
issue has nothing to do with the issue of
equal rights for differing groups.
Our constitution holds that all
men are created equal, but laws are
made to deal with unequal behavior.
(Falwell, 1980:181-84)
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As with the abortion issue, once homosexuality is
accpted, it logically follows for the pro-family movement
that it will pave the way for the acceptance of other
undesirable behavior:

"If homosexuality is deemed

normal, how long will it be before rape, adultery,
alcoholism, drug addiction, and incest are labeled as
normal?"

(Falwell,

1980:184)

Heterosexuality is a crucial component of the
New Right family picture.

Homosexuality challenges

the belief that traditional male/female roles,
heterosexuality and marriage constitute the "natural
order of things."

Gays and lesbians challenge the

hegemonic nature of the family:

by living an alternative

lifestyle they challenge the idea that the traditional
nuclear family is the only family unit, that hetero
sexuality is the only pattern for sexual relationships.
Through its anti-gay campaign, the New Right seeks
to protect "the social aspects of traditional gender
identies and particularly the position of male paternal
and heterosexual authority."

(Petchesky, 1981:231)

Homosexuality throws into question the
very idea of what it means to be a 'man*
or a ’w o m a n ’, and the structure and
meaning of the traditional family.
These two concepts are clearly related,
for the meaning of ’mascul init y’ (as of
’femi ninity’ — that is, of gender itself—
has been defined historically through
the structure of the family and dominant
position of the father within it.
(Petchesky, 1981:231)
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As with abortion,

it appears that the anti

homosexual movement is largely a response to the growing
visibility, and to some extent, legitimation, of
homosexuality.

When gay people remained in the "closet",

i.e. remained invisible, the hegemonic nature of the
family and sexual relationships could remain intact.
But once gay people no longer, in Falwell's words,
remained a "quiet minority" but rather became a very
"vocal minority demanding to be accepted as a legitimate
minority", they had gone too far.

(Falwell, 1980:183)

The Family Protection Act
In response to what they view as the ever-growing
threats to the family— abortion, homosexuality, divorce,
etc.--the New Right has sponsored the Family Protection
Act, a comprehensive piece of legislation which they
hope would counteract disruptive intervention of the
federal government into family life, and encourage the
restoration of the traditional nuclear family.

An omnibus

bill setting forth the pro-family agenda, the Act was
drafted by Paul Weyrich and his associates.
in the bill,

says Falwell,

Everything

"supports traditional values,

encourages families to stay together, upholds parental
authority, and reinforces traditional husband-and-wife
relationships."
Preotection Act,

(Falwell,

1980:136-37)

says Viguerie,

The Family

"would make wholesome

family life a national priority"; it would "reestablish
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the family as the basic unit of strength for America."
(Viguerie, 1981:154-55)
The Family Protection Act illustrates the New
R i g h t ’s attempt to translate its political/moral agenda
into legislation, and it offers a comprehensive view of
where the pro-family movement would like to go.

The Act

has not passed in its entire form, and because it is such
a broad piece of legislation, it is considered unlikely
that it will pass as a total package.

However, by

breaking the bill down, they have enhanced its chances
of passage by proposing many of the individual points
separately and thus diffusing the energies of the
opposition.

It is likely that the Family Protection Act

will be a springboard for future legislative action.
Viguerie anticipates,

As

"The act will be a benchmark for

years to come for the kind of sensible actions the federal
government should be taking to preserve traditional
family values in America."

(Viguerie,

1981:154)

The Family Protection Act has been called the
pro-family coaliti on’s "blueprint for a Moral America"
and can be considered a paradigm for the New R i g h t ’s
pro-family politics.
Paul Laxalt

First introduced into Congress by

(Republican-Nevada), its goals, as stated

in the legislative statement of purpose, are to
"strengthen the American Family and to remove those
Federal government policies which inhibit its strength
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and prosperity."

The major provisions of the bill have

to do with education,
taxation.

domestic relations, welfare and

Specific provisions promote a public policy

favoring marriage,

childbirth, heterosexuality and the

role of the husband as household head.

The provisions

include:
•

the witholding of federal funds from any

program which fails to notify parents before providing
contractption, abortion or abortion counseling to
unmarried minors.

It also punishes by a $5,000 fine, any

program which fails to notify parents within twenty-four
hours of the commencement of treatment for veneral
dise a s e .
•

It excludes homosexuals from Title VII and

prohibits any agency of the federal government from
enforcing non-discrimination in favor of such individuals.
It denies funds to
any public or private individual, group,
foundation, commission, corporation,
association, or other entity which
presents homosexuality, male or female,
as an acceptable alternative life style
or suggests that it can be an acceptable
life style. (Title V, Sec. 507)
•

It would prohibit federal funding to:
any program which produces or promotes
courses of instruction or curriculum
seeking to inculcate values or modes
of behavior which contradict the
demonstrated beliefs and values of
the community. (Title I, Sec. 101)
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It would also prohibit federal funding to any program
which supports educational materials or studies which
would "tend to denigrate,

diminish, or deny the role

differences between the sexes as it has been historically
understood in the United States."

(Title I, Sec.

101)

Through its "states’ rights" strategy, the
Family Protection Act would use the elimination of
federal funding as a tool to implement the New Right's
ideology, and "as punishment for the failure of any
state to conform to this ideology."

(Schulman,

1981:5)

Reprivit ization
The New Right advocates the separation between the
private and the public spheres and puts forth the view
that it is a natural dichotomy.

They seek to

reprivatize especially those areas where women and minority
groups have managed to bring some modicum of reform
through struggle over the past couple of decades.
Joined by major segments of the corporate,
capitalist and state power structures,
the New Right is trying to designate
the private as ’p r i v a t e ’ once again, but
in a particular sense.
The aim is
surely to reprivatize every domain of
social, public intervention that has
been created through the struggles of
working people, blacks, the poor, and
women for the last twenty years.
Not
only abortion, sex education, and
domestic violence services, but health
care, education, the right to equal
education, legal services, health and
safety at work, access to the broadcasting
media are all being pushed back into the
unregulated anarchy of the private sector.
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The legitimation for this massive
attempt to destroy the meager reforms
that were won from the liberal state in
the 1960s and 70s is the myth of
'privatism'— the idea that what's wrong
with busing or medicaid abortions or
the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) or the Environ
mental Protection Agency is that the
federal government is "meddling in our
'private' business"; that, indeed there
even exists some private, safe, secure
place— our neighborhoods, our churches,
above all the family--that would give
us everything we needed if only the
government would stay out. (Petchesky,
1981:223-24)
The New Right says it wants to get government off
the backs of the people; and yet, it proposes and
supports legislation such as the Human Life Amendment
which would make abortion illegal, thus denying women
the personal freedom to choose when and if they want to
have children.

The Family Protection Act is supposed to

protect the family from government interference, and
yet, under this program "government would inevitably be
more than ever inserted into the private lives and
values of individuals, through a kind of moral police."
(Petchesky,

1981:226)

For instance, the bill would

eliminate many existing feminist and gay rights programs
which rely heavily on federal funding.

It would require

parental notification prior to teenager's receiving
birth control or abortion services and veneral disease
treatment.

The social and political impact of these

provisions would restrict peoples'

sexual and political
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activities.

And yet, for the New Right, there is no

contradiction.

The State would not be interfering but

rather protecting the family— which is a "natural” unit-from "unnatural" influences, e.g. abortion, homosexuality,
premarital sex.
...the r i g h t ’s attitude toward the state,
in its ’new r i g h t ’ form, is commonly taken
to be contradictory— calling on the one hand
for diminished state economic involvement
and social welfare policy; yet seeming
to affirm a growing repressive intervention
into social life (against abortion, for
e xam ple).
For the new right discourse, there is no
logical contradiction; the state should
not intervene, but instead secure the
existence of ’n a t u r a l ’ nonpolitical
processes, through coercion if necessary.
Thus the state should maintain the
conditions necessary for the operations
of markets and maintain the conditions
necessary for the flourishing of
traditional family and social relation
ships, by barring disruptive influences.
Though this image of ’n a t ural’
economic processes and social/familial
community is, for the left, a massive
distortion, it is possible for the right
to construct a coherent anti-statist
discourse that fuses opposition to
state economic regulation and to
egalitarian social policies regarding
women— in both cases asserting the
ideal of an autonomous, natural order
prior to the states disruption.
(Plotke, 1981:3^)
If the New Right is successful, issues related to the
family would once again be depoliticized; they would
be relegated to tradition,
natural rules of the game."

custom— to the "implicit
(Hunter,

1981:135)
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Petchesky also argues that the New R i g h t 1s demand
for privacy and its call for an end to state interference
in the personal realm, e.g. the family, is actually made
on behalf of corporate bodies rather than individuals.
For instance, one of the provisions of the Family
Protection Act

(Sec.

301) would establish the immunity

of all religious and other private welfare and education
programs from any federal government supervision.

In

this view, privacy becomes a corporate attribute,
rather than one belonging to individuals as persons.
Although the language of New Right
ideology evokes the sentiment of personal
freedom from state interference, what
distinguishes that ideology from
classical conservatism is that it is
spoken on behalf of corporate bodies
rather than individuals.
It is, in
other words, corporate privatism— in
the service of business, church, private
school, and patriarchal family— that
is intended, not individual privacy.
(Petchesky, 1981:224)

CHAPTER IV
THE NEW RIGHT:

BEYOND 1980

The 1982 Elections
The 1982 elections were significant for the
conservative movement.

For the New Right, they would

show whether they would maintain and continue to build
on the strength of the conservative coalition that they
had forged.

For the Republican Party, which was the

chief beneficieary of the conservative movement's success,
the 1982 mid-term elections were to be a test of whether
a new realignment had occurred in 1980

(as had happened

with Franklin Roosevelt's Democratic Party in 1934), or
whether their victory, too, was temporary.

1982 would

show whether the electorate would vote to continue the
trend of 1982.

(Judis,

1983:25)

Setback for Conservatism
The elections proved a setback for the conservative
movement— both in and out of the Republican Party.
Twenty-six Republicans were removed from Congress, a
substantial loss, especially in view of the fact that
it was the first off-year election with their party's
president in power.

Of thirty-six contested governor

ships, Republicans won only nine.
95.

The New Right
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suffered even more serious blows.

Of the fourteen

Senatorial candidates targeted by Terry Dolan's
National Conservative Political Action Committee
(NCPAC), only one— Howard Cannon of Nevada— was defeated.
Jesse Helm's Congressional Club in North Carolina lost
all six of the races it targeted.

And in West Virginia

and Alabama, the two Republicans elected in 1980, who
were most closely identified with the Moral Majority
(David Stanton and Albert Smith)
Democratic challengers.

lost heavily to

(Judis, 1983:26)

In the referendum balloting, however, the New
Right fared better.
issue

Though it did po.orly on the nuclear

(nuclear freeze referenda won in all but one of

the nine states and all but two of the forty towns and
cities where they were on the ballot), the New Right won
on most other issues,

including gun control, bottle-

deposit, and taxation restraint proposals.
In 1978,

columnist David Broder, while commenting

on the problem of low and declining voter participation,
remarked that perhaps the best prescription would be a
good dose of conservative government.

(Gans, 1983:11)

Whether or not it was because of a "good dose of
conservative government", the 1982 election did, for the
first time in two decades,

result in an increased

voter turnout in a mid-term election, reversing, at least
temporarily, a twenty year trend in declining voter
participation.

Curtis B. Gans, director of the Committee
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for the study of the American Electorate* made these
observations about the 1982 elections:
First* this was an election of anger.
The increases in turnout and the turn
around in seats in the House and state
houses were caused by fear among blacks
and working class voters about the
impact of Reaganomics on their lives*
livelihoods and aspirations.
Second* the principal victim was the
far right.
It is unlikely that that
force will disappear as long as the
fundamentalism upon which it is based
remains a part of American life* but
it is virtually certain that its
issues— abortion* gun control* school
prayer and busing— will not be at the
center of the American agenda in the
near f u t u r e .
Third* the 1980 Reagan "mandate" was
obviously personal rather than
p rogra mma tic. The President did not
suffer a repudiation on the scale
of J o h n s o n ’s in 1966 or N i x o n ’s in
197^* but the electorate made it
clear that there was no mandate for
dismantling detente* emasculating
environmental regulation or reducing
government services. (Gans* 1983:12)
Those were the immediate messages of the 1982 election*
says Gans.

The long-term message of the 1982 elections*

he contends*

is that both major political parties are

in trouble.

It is virtually inconceivable* he says*

that the Republicans can hold onto their national power
without an upturn in the economy.

And as for the

Democrats* they fared better in 1982* not on their own
merit* but simply because R e a g a n ’s policies defeated
themselves.

"If the economy had not been in trouble"
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observes Gans*

"they would have emerged from this election

empty-handed."

(Gans* 1983:13)

He predicts that the

Democratic Party will move to 1984 as it did in the past
election* hoping for the Republicans to defeat themselves*
and it is quite possible that the Democrats will win.
However*
the only sustaining basis for continued
increased turnout and the renewed
vitality of the American political
system is the hope that government and
politics can produce programmatic
answers to the political* social and
economic problems of most Americans.
(Gans, 1983:13)
Grounds for that hope* he commented* were not evidenced
in the 1982 elections.
The New Right faulted R e a g a n ’s "stay the course"
strategy* and the White H o u s e ’s "abandonment" of the
conservative movement*

for the 1982 election upset.

By

deliberately distancing himself from the New Right* Reagan
turned his back on the very people whose support elected
him into office* they contend.

Disheartened by R e a g a n ’s

"lip service" to social issues* the Moral Majority took
a far less active role in the 1982 elections than they
did in 1980.

(Conservative Dig est * 12/82:56)

Many of the

conservative activists who enthusiastically worked for
the Reagan/Republican team in 1980*
unimpressed with the Reagan term.

sat this election out*
Even before the 1982

election* New Right members were expressing their
dissatisfaction with Reagan.

They attacked his appoint-

99.
ments

(for example* Sandra Day O ’Connor’s appointment

to the U.S. Supreme Court infuriated pro-family/anti
abortion activists because of O ’Connor's past support
for abortion rights); his failure to make enough budget
cuts; his "sell out" to China* his "acquiesence" in
SALT II* and his failure to make serious efforts to
abolish the Cabinet level Departments of Energy and
Education* and his mere "token" support of the New Right
social agenda.
1983:26)

(Conservative Digest* 12/82:56; Judis*

Reagan lost hundreds of thousands of campaign

vol unteers:
In 1980* millions of conservatives*
born-again Christians switched their
votes from Democrat to Republican.
But
in 1982* the White House apparently
decided to purposely not go after these
votes again.
As a result* many of the
hundreds of thousands of volunteers who
made the 1980 campaign a crusade were
less inclined this year to spend the
countless hours making telephone calls*
addressing envelopes* knocking on doors*
putting up signs* etc. (Conservative Digest,
12 / 8 2 :5 6 )
The New Right faults Reagan with his making "Reaganomics"
the referendum question of the election.

For the

Democrats* that meant blaming unemployment* high interest
rates and economic stagnation on Reagan and the
Republican Party.

"Economics" was the key issue in

1982 as it was in 1980.

However* in 1980 it was Carter

and the Democratic Party that were associated with the
n a t i o n ’s economic ills.

Many blue-collar Democrats*

drawn to R e a g a n ’s articulation of social conservatism*
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and disillusioned with Carter and liberalism*

switched

party lines in the hope that R e a g a n ’s supply-side
economics would work.

However* in 1982 many voters

found that they were no better off than they were in
1980.

And since people tend to be more interested in

"bread and butter" issues in times of austerity than in
social issues* the Republican Party could not hold the
support of the Democratic blue-collar workers.

The

Republican Party found itself in a weakened position:
The Republican Party was branded with the
one stigma it can least endure:
the party
of hard times.
The tide of right-wing
populist resentment against elitist
control of the government and interference
into their own lives was obliterated by
the pain of unemployment.
Conservative
politicians who had struck a resonant
chord with with blue collar workers’
anger over busing* welfare and crime
failed to respond to that w o r k e r ’s
economic torment. (Conservative Digest
12/ 8 2 :56 )
Instead of making Reaganomics the referendum question*
the Republicans should have made the election a
referendum on liberalism.
taken the offensive*

The Republicans should have

says Viguerie* and let "the liberal

Democrats try to explain their opposition to constitutional
amendments to restore prayer in public schools* to require
balanced federal budgets and to prohibit forced busing
of school children."

(Conservative Digest* 12/82:56)

Instead* the Administration allowed "liberal Democrats
to establish the ground rules and the framework of the
election."

(Conservative Digest* 12/82:13)
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Paul Weyrich concedes that the New Right must
share some of the blame for the 1982 election results.
Once conservatives were elected to office* the New Right
began playing the "Washington game":
It is so easy* once life eases up* to
forget what you learned in the trenches.
We did just that.
When a President who
ran as a conservative was elected and the
conservatives increased their strength in
the House and the Republicans won control
of the Senate* we immediately adjusted.
No one ever said as much* but we fell
into playing the Washington game.
Were
we out in the countryside creating the
issues?
No* we thought the administration
would do t h a t . Were we making the
liberals pay for what they were doing?
No* we were sure that sooner or later the
administration would do t h a t . The things
we did between 1977-1980* which produced
all of those ’sur pris e’ victories* were
not done in the last two y e a r s . In the
meanwhile* we were busy playing games with
the administration* none of which ever
amounted to a hill of beans. (Conservative
Digest* 12/82:9)
Realignment or Dealignment?
In the wake of the 1980 elections* with R e a g a n ’s
victory and the large number of Republican congressional
gains* it was widely speculated that a realignment in
American politics had occurred* and that conservatives
would control the new political system.

R e a g a n ’s victory

was often compared to Franklin Roosevelt’s* suggesting
that a similar realignment had occurred for the Republican
Party as it did for the Democrats in the 1930s when
Roosevelt* by adopting the more popular side of the issue
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of government intervention in the economy* broke the
35-40 year dominance of the Republican Party and in turn
ushered in a long period of Democratic dominance.
(Douglas* 1981:174)
According to this speculation of a new realignment*
1982 was to be a "key" or what V.O. Key* Jr. termed in
1955* a "critical election"— a "type of election in which
there occurs a sharp and durable electoral realignment
between parties."

(Douglas* 1981:173)

Sundquist

(1973)

defines the process of realignment in such a critical or
key election as one in which:
the composition of the parties (even the
identity of one) and the character of the
political struggle between them was
altered fundamentally so that the country
passed from one distinct national party
system to another. (Sundquist* 1973 •
*28)
However* the 1982 election results ended
speculation about re alignment.

It seems more appropriate

to speak of the "continuing dealignment of the American
party structure."

(Chapin* 1983:6)

(emphasis added)

Dealignment suggests a general loosening of partisan
loyalties which is confirmed by Crotty and Jacobson
(1980) in their analysis of party identification.

Their

research shows that personal identification with a party
is becoming less common and less important.
Fewer people are identifying with either
of the political parties* and even
among those who do* the intensity of
their identification is falling off
markedly.
As a consequence* party
identification has become less
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meaningful for predicting the v o t e .
Loyalty to a party and its candidates
had declined seriously. (Crotty* 1980:27)
They note further that this trend of weakened party
identification has affected the two parties differently.
The Democratic party's coalition* being "considerably
larger" and far more malleable than the Republican's*
means that "the larger Democratic coalition is far more
likely to defect than is the smaller group of Republican
identifiers."

(Crotty* 1980:29;32)

Polls of voters exiting from the voting booths
in 1980 identified those who turned from Carter to Reagan.
The majority were "white and male and they came from
traditionally Democratic ranks* union members*
and southerners."

(Scammon*

defectors rejected Carter*

1983:24)

Catholics

These Democratic

shared Reagan's conservatism

on social issues* and hoped that Reagan's economic
policies would succeed where Carter's failed.

However*

their return to the Democratic ranks in the 1982 elections
indicated that their defection represented continued party
dealignment rather than re alignment.

This trend of

party dealignment increased with the rise of single-issue
groups in the late 1970s.

"As people become active in

single-issue campaigns* they often abandon their old
party affiliations en route."

(Davis* 1981:45)

In 1980

this trend benefitted the Republicans; in 1982 it did
not.
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The New Populism
The New Right rose to prominence through its
ability to mobilize and draw into its organizational
network,

the constituencies of the single-issue groups

that mushroomed in this country during the 1970s.
Viguerie recalls,

As

"Conservatives suddenly started to win

elections by attracting people who are interested in what
are now called

’single iss ues.’" (Conservative Dige s t , 10/82:2)

Through New Right organizing efforts, the anti-gay/ERA/
abortion/gun control and pro-school prayer constituencies
developed into a powerful pro-family coalition that
helped propel Reagan and the Republicans to victory in the
1980 elections.
The New Right and' the conservative movement, however,
suffered a setback at the polls during the 1982 election.
Knowing that political power can be transitory, the New
Right has changed its electoral strategy and shifted
its focus to a new set of issues.

For example, the National

Conservative Political Action Committee

(NCPAC), which

relied heavily on "hit lists" and tough, negative
advertising against liberal politicians, has announced its
plans to "accentuate the positive" in 1984 and to emphasize
positive ads.

While the "tough" tactics of NCPAC appeared

to serve the New Right and the conservative cause well in
1980,

it did not prove successful in the 1982 elections

and thus NCPAC is switching tactics for the 1984 elections.
NCPAC Chairperson, Terry Dolan, has stated that while
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NCPAC will still target liberal candidates for defeat
in 1984* most of its efforts will be geared toward the
presidential campaigns.

Its plans include the recruiting

of one million volunteers* organizing rallies* producing
a thirty minute television documentary* and launching a
$5 million "American Heroes for Reagan" campaign aimed
at reelecting the president.

(Peterson*

1 9 8 3 :A6)

Likewise* the Moral Majority plans to mount
"positive" campaigns in the 1984 congressional races.
For example*

it is now discouraging efforts to censor books

in local libraries* and instead* is seeking to get more
conservative religious books put on the library shelves.
As Moral Majority Vice President Cal Thomas explains this
shift:
I think a positive campaign will work.
We need to stay away from inflammatory
rhetoric* like calling people who
support legalized abortion ’murderers
and baby k illers.’ Negative campaigns
contribute to a lack of discourse and
stereotyping of issues.
T h a t ’s hurt
us in the past. (Peterson* 1 9 8 3 :A6)
Even more significant than the New Right's campaign
tactics is the effort by New Right leaders to recast them
selves as "new populists."

The entire October*

1982

issue of the Conservative Digest was devoted to propound
ing the "new populism" politics.

Defining the New

Populist revolt as an uprising against big banks* big
labor* big government and media elitists* Viguerie
remarked:

"This is the most significant development

among conservatives since the New Right."

(Peterson,

1983)
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Sensing a growing populist constituency, the New
Right hopes to give conservative direction to the "millions
of Americans who feel that neither liberals nor conservatives,
Democrats nor Republicans really care about their concerns,
The New Right's coalition of single-issue groups proved
very successful early in the New Right's political life.
However, as Viguerie noted:
This coalition has been a success.
But
unless a new coalition develops and
continues to build upon the one the
Conservative Movement built, our success
could become just a flash in American
history. (Conservative Digest, 10/82:2)
Viguerie has high hopes for the conservative New Populist
coalition, believing that it can "govern at local,

state

and national levels far into the 21st century" if it joins
with "tens of millions of angry and frustrated Americans."
(Conservative D i g e s t , 10/82:2)

These Americans are angry,

he says, because of high crime rates, drugs, Internal
Revenue Service rules, high taxes, illegal aliens and high
interest rates.
says Viguerie,

They are angry at the liberal establishment,
for

getting us in a no-win land war in Vietnam,
keeping God and religion off network
produced TV shows, sending our tax money to
countries that despise us, trade agreements
that keep American products out of foreign
countries. (Conservative D i g e s t , 10/82:3)
Harry Boyte,

a leftist political activist,

describes the

populist mood in the United States less specifically:
A deep sense of grievance is felt by
millions of formerly silent citizens skepticism about all large institutions
coupled with the feeling that an
unresponsive and arrogant elite has
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dishonored and exploited the American
people and their traditions and values.
This sense of aggrieved peoplehood is
at the center of a populist mood.
(Boyte, 1980:38)
Burton Pines, research director of the Heritage
Foundation,

observes what he labels "traditionalist"

tendencies reemerging in industry, religion, education
and other areas of American life.

If the various grass

roots elements of these traditionalist movements are to
become a significant political force, they need to come
together.

If the conservative movement is to martial

these grassroots elements, contends Pines, it will require
a "concerted effort by the various strands of the Tradit
ionalist leadership:

the New Right, the Religious Right,

the neo-conservatives and the old conservatives."
(Conservative Digest, 11/82:36)
Conservative writer Kevin Phillips sees the
emergence of "middle class radicalism" arising from an
angered and frustrated middle class that has "lost its
party moorings"— a group that has broken its long-term
relationship with the Democratic Party and yet is
disillusioned by Republican economics.
Dig est , 10/82:30)
Weyrich,

(Conservative

The Reagan administration,

contends

is viewed by many as being pro-management as

well as pro-business.

It is seen as having a "do-

nothing" economic philosophy, which has caused bluecollar workers to estrange themselves from the Repub
lican ad ministration.
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Says Weyrich,
These workers don't want the federal
government Imposing all sorts of controls...
But the workers want to see an activist
presidency.
We all know Franklin Roosevelt
didn't do anything to solve the depression.
But he was given high marks for trying.
(Conservative Dig est , 10/82:59)
Looking ahead to the near future, Pines envisions
that conservative p o p u l i s m .will play a decisive role in
politics.

He writes,

...by the 1990s the balance of power could
rest with a populist or corporatist brand
of conservatism that combines business
interests with blue-collar electorates into
this group - crime, race, nationalism.
Protectionism and immigration are also
issues unions share with conservatives.
This aggregation would support activist
government on economic matters, aiding
troubled industries and farmers, while at
the same time adhering to a relatively
conservative position on moral issues.
(Conservative D i g e s t , 10/82:30)
?he New Right realizes the political significance
of the growing populist sentiment and of the importance
of filling the leadership role for the m o v e m e n t .
Conservative Robert J. Hoy believes the New Right is in
the best position to fill the leadership rolej
Populist America today lacks political
leaders of its own.
Its power is currently
undirected and dissipated.
Therein lies
the great challenge and opportunity for the
New Right, which is the only political
current in a position to concentrate and
direct that power. (Hoy, 1982:102)
In the October,

1982 issue of the Conservative Dige s t ,

Viguerie outlined "Ten Populist Proposals for America."
The proposals are: 1) a flat-rate tax to replace the
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progressive income tax; 2) limited terms for Federal
judges;

3) reform of Civil Service laws to ’’ensure that

bureaucrats are accountable to the American people through
the President”; 4) a halt to illegal aliens;
credits for private schools;
victims;

5) tax

6) compensation for crime

7) support for the sagebrush rebellion, to free

up for development the millions of acres in Western
United States now owned by the federal government;

8) the

right of "item veto" for the President which would allow
the President the authority to veto specific parts of
bills passed by Congress;
competition;
for Congress.

9) restrictions of foreign

and, 10) the halting of special privileges
(Conservative Digest, 10/82:10)

^Noticeably absent from the New R i g h t ’s populist
proposals are the social issues which propelled it into
the forefront of American politics only a few years ago:
abortion, homosexuality,
family" issues^]

school prayer, and other "pro-

As Viguerie explains this change, the

"New Right agenda and issues took us a long way, but
we have to add something to the mix."

(Peterson, 1 9 8 3 :A6)

When the proposed constitutional Amendment to ban
abortions was defeated in June, 1983* Senator Hatch,
the A m endment 1s principal sponsor remarked,
I'm going on to other issues."

"Frankly,

(Dewar, 1983:A1)

The populist tradition in this country is most
often associated with the agrarian revolts of the late
19th century.

Pope

(1982) describes the early movement as
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an exciting story of ordinary people,
people who had once thought there was no
way out of their desperate plight, who
then began to realize their combined
strength, their growing self-respect as
they fought against powers that seemed
omnipotent. (Pope, 1982:140)
This "story” is similar to that articulated by New Right
populists.

The image of the "little guy" struggling against

entrenched bureaucracies and ruling elites is invoked.
One feature of the New R i g h t ’s use of tradition is that
many of its symbols and images are abstract.

They lack

detail.
The abstractness of the symbols and images
the New Right uses is ’functional’ because
it allows people in different classes,
subcultures, regions, and religions to fill
in the details from their own relevant
sets of experiences. (Hunter, 1981:133)
Much of the imagery and ideology of the New R i g h t ’s
populism is vague, as was their pro-family ideology which
subsequently appealed to many different sectors of people.
The image of the family,

articulated by the New Right,

allowed
social conservatives among isolated
suburbanites, working-class city dwellers,
rural whites, Mormons, Catholics and
Protestants all to see their idealized
families in the ideology and imagery of
the New Right. (Hunter, 1981:133)
Likewise, the New R i g h t ’s populist rhetoric is sufficiently
vague to appeal to sectors of the population not traditionally
conservative.

For example, New Rightist Congressperson,

Jack Kemp (Republican-New York) vaguely defines populism
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as "optimism about people and their willingness to respond
to economic incentives as well as their ability to best
control their own and their fami lies ’ destinies."

He

says that he is a populist because he believes in freedom
and democracy.

(Conservative Digest, 10/82:9)

And while

populism is generally associated with "progressive" or
"liberal" politics, John "Terry" Dolan explains that there
are elements of populism which fit. in well with a "new
conservative majority agenda."
One of the underpinnings of populism is
its suspicion and opposition to ’b i g n e s s , ’
something thoroughly consistent with
conservative thought. (Conservative Digest,
10/ 8 2 :58 )
The populist approach is also associated with
democratic mass movements and direct democracy.

Traditionally,

conservatives have taken a dim view of direct methods of
democracy,

"seeking instead to channel majority will through

a complex arrangement of institutions that moderate the
voice of the people."

(Crawford, 5/80:2)

The New Right

departs from traditional conservatism in this respect:
the New Right, impatient for short-run results,
has rejected this dominant theme of
conservatism in favor of direct democracy.
It is their belief that more and more issues should
be decided by ’the p e o p l e ’ through the ballot
box rather than by their elected represent
atives or by intentionally unrepresentative
institutions such as the courts. (Crawford, 5/80:20)
Initiatives and referenda are popular vehicles of
populism.

The beginnings of the expression of the current

populist sentiment has been associated with the "tax
revolt" in 1978 in California with Proposition 13, when
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a tax-cutting measure was put on the ballot because
1.2 million people signed a petition to put it there.
Citizen initiatives of the 1970s received widest play
on the issue of homosexual rights.

Of the six anti-gay

rights referenda in 1977 and 1978, the cause of civil
rights for gay people lost in all but one.

(Crawford,

5/82:3)
The New Right prefers direct voter participation
in matters often left to the legislative branch.

Alan

Crawford observes that by attempting to limit the
judicial and legislative functions, the New Right leaves
only "the executive branch and ’the p e o p l e ’, no checks,
no balances— the exact contrary of the eighteenth
century conservatives who worked out the Constitution."
(Crawford,

5/80:6)

This sets up a model in which there

is an expansive presidency whose power is limited only
by the "will of the people."
A country in which highly sensitive
questions are settled by continual
referenda would be one of constant moral
contention.
The New Rightists seem to
prefer the fanatics and demagogues—
the Anita Bryants, Howard Jarvises,
and John Briggses— to the reasoned,
responsible leadership associated with
classic conservatism. (Crawford, 5/80:9)
Already, notes Crawford,

such sensitive personal

questions as abortion and homosexuality are put to the
public for its approval.

He fears that the Right,

through the leadership of the New Right, is moving
from a "traditional conservative defense of representative
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government against the onslaughts of direct democracy
into a celebration of government by rabble-rousing,
by adding machine, and by majorities of the moment."
(Crawford,

5/80:9)

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
While the origins of the contemporary Right lay
in the conservative reaction to the New Deal alignment
which began in the mid-1930s, it was the 1964 Goldwater
presidential campaign which specifically laid the
groundwork for what was later to be termed the
"New R i g h t .’’
The Goldwater campaign served as a training
ground for New Right activists:

it was during Cold-

w a t e r ’s campaign that his supporters first conducted a
large scale campaign to solicit political contributions
through the mails.

Displaying a commitment to right-

wing ideology and political agenda, rather than the
Republican Party per se, the New Right leaders learned
lessons during the Goldwater campaign that they would
later successfully apply to elections in the 1970s and
1980.

They recognized that Goldwater alienated millions

of voters by attacking popular New Deal reforms that
had benefited the middle class as well as the working
class.

And they learned that to win over elements of

the Democratic coalition, they needed to focus on
bipartisan single-issue campaigns with a rightist dynamic,
rather than focusing on "frontal ideological clashes."
114.

115.
(Davis, 198l:17;36)

S o , during the 1970s, and continuing

through the 1980 election, the New Right emphasized
social and cultural issues, rather than its economic
program, and enjoyed growing support from constituencies
mobilized around single-issue campaigns.
The New Right began taking on organizational
coherence in 1974 when the core of its leadership—
Viguerie, Weyrich,

Phillips and Dolan— laid the organ

izational foundation for the movement.

The New Right

gained a strong foothold in American politics because it
was able to give leadership to, and draw together into
a coalition, the single-issue groups that arose in the
1970s.

In his theory of mobilization, Oberschall (1973)

writes:
Rapid mobilization does not occur through
recruitment of large numbers of isolated
and solitary individuals.
It occurs as
a result of recruiting blocs of people who
are already highly organized.
Many move
ments result from a sudden merger of a
number of preexisting associations.
(Oberschall, 1973:12 5)
The New Right rapidly gained political prominence by
1980, not because it "created" a movement, but because
it tapped into and brought together already existing
political groups.
New Right leaders, frustrated with the Old
R i g h t ’s lack of a majority strategy, devised a strategy
of "allying ’social conservatives’— blue-collar Democrats
concerned about abortion, busing, and the decline of
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patriotism— with the
Republican Party."

’economic conservatives’ of the

(Judis, 1983:22)

And it was

primarily through the pro-family movement, which brought
together the constituencies of the anti-abortion, anti
homosexuality, anti-ERA and pro-school prayer groups,
that the New Right was able to broaden the conservative
coalition and draw support from socially conservative
Democrats.

Thus the New R i g h t ’s social conservatism

provided major inroads into traditionally Democratic
strongholds.
This strategy seemed successful in the 1980
election when a significant percentage of traditional
blue-collar Democrats opted for Reagan over Carter.
However, many of them returned to the Democratic Party
in 1982, suggesting that while they were susceptible
to appeals to pro-family social conservatism,

economic

concerns overshadowed other issues when it came time to
pull the lever.

In 1980, these blue-collar Democrats

were willing to take a chance on Reagan, hoping that
his economic program would succeed.
the economic crisis had deepened.

However, by 1982,
R e a g a n ’s conservative

policies
did not survive their encounter with
the realities of global stagflation and
superpower rivalry.
High unemployment,
persistent inflation, and flagging economic
growth in the United States were part of
a world capitalist slump, caused by
overcapacity in such basic industries as
steel, textiles, automobiles, and
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petrochemicals.
In 1982, rising interest
rates precipitated a near-depression.
They choked off consumer purchases of
cars and homes, virtually shutting
down the automobile and housing
industries and such related producers
as timber and steel.
High interest
rates also stimulated an influx of
foreign currencies, which boosted
the value of the dollar relative to
European and Japanese money.
The
overvalued dollar raised the relative
prices of American exports, causing
large trade deficits in 1981 and 1982
despite declining oil imports.
(Judis, 1983:23-24)
And so, in 1982, many Democrats who had defected in 1980,
returned home to their party.

While this ended spec

ulation that a realignment— in which the country passes
from one party system to another— had occurred in 1980,
it did suggest a continuing dealignment of the American
party structure, where party identification becomes less
common and less important.
Perhaps because of its seemingly sudden
appearance on the American political scene,

its television

preachers, and its high-pitched, rabble-rousing style,
the New Right became a subject of fascination for the
media.

After the 1980 election swept the conservatives

into office, much of the media echoed the New Right
leaders’ assessment that the country had taken a sharp
turn to the right, and that the New Right was largely
responsible for the conservative victory.

After the

dust settled, and after the 19&2 elections routed
many Republicans from office, the impact of the New Right
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was reassessed.

A second, closer look suggested that

the strength and impact of the New Right had been
ove rsta ted .
C^While it no longer seems that the New Right is
on the verge of taking political control of the country,
as many suggested after the 1980 election, the New Right
nevertheless must be judged by its own merits as a
political force in American politicsfj The New Right
"is an identifiable political reality, which had visible
success in mobilizing conservative voters and in
creating an effective organizational machine in recent
elections."

(Petchesky,

1981:207)

In addition to the emergence of the single-issue
groups in the 1970s, which provided the soil in which
the New Right was able to take root and flourish, the
New R i g h t ’s success can also be attributed to the, alliance
between religion and politics.

The religious right and

the secular right established a close working relation
ship around issues related to the family,
reproduction.

sexuality and

By mobilizing religious social

conservatives, the New Right was able to reach people who
had never been politically active and people who were
not economic conservatives.

This alliance, which

organizationally resulted in the pro-family coalition,
provided a golden opportunity for organizational
"cross pollination"— leading,

for example, to the

formation of Moral Majority— the largest of the New R i g h t ’s
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religious organizations.
As a result of what seemed to be their declining
political strength,, which was verified by their poor
showing at the voting booths in 1982, New Right leaders
began to revise their strategy for gaining a conserv
ative majority.

While social issues afforded the

New Right inroads into sectors of the population not
previously identified as right-wing, the 1982 elections
showed that pro-family coalitions alone could not ensure
the New Right the formation of the conservative majority
it longed for.

While ideologically the New Right is

still committed to social conservatism, its leaders are
political realists.

When political expediency requires

them to do so, they will switch to a new set of issues,
and employ new tactics to achieve political success.
Central to the New R i g h t Ts new strategy is their
articulation of a "new populism" politics.

The New

Right hopes to capitalize on the already existing
populist sentiment in the United States.

The New

R i g h t ’s articulation of social conservatism took it a
long way:

it was largely responsible for the New R i g h t ’s

rapid rise to political prominence.

However,

in order

to maintain its momentum the New Right now has its eye
on what it considers a large populist constituency waiting
to be organized.

As it did with the single-issue groups

of the 1970s, the New Right will try to provide leader
ship and organizational coherence, and thus give
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conservative direction to, the growing populist mood.
It appears quite likely that the New Right will
remain on the American political scene for some time to
come, with their power rising and falling as happened
skilled at using

during 19 80

the political process and they know how to scent out
the issues that can move peopleTj

But at present, their

hopes for achieving a conservative majority do not seem
realistic.

The coalition that the New Right forged

between economic conservatives and social conservatives
is a tenuous one.

Early in their relationship, the

social conservatives were lured into the New Right camp
by the l a tt er1s call for a return to traditional morality
and allegiance to God, Nation, and Family.

The New

Right articulated the fears and frustrations of the
constituencies of the socially conservative single-issue
groups, many of which represented the backlash against
the sixties readicalism.

However, a large number of

the social conservatives do not support the New R i g h t Ts
economic conservatism.

Three years ago, Davis

(1981)

predicted that this conflict would eventually surfa ce:
As long as they enjoy the luxury of
irresponsible dissent, there isn't
much reason for the evangelicals and
the single-issue people to examine all
the other doctrines of the ideologues
who pull the strings; until his leaders
gain some power, the single-issue
fanatic enjoys the enviable privilege
of the hedgehog who knows one big thing,
and the world is a wonderfully simple
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place.
But Weyrlch and the others
happen to have a lot of funny ideas
about a lot of subjects.
They are
not great fans of the social legislation
that sustains them in hard times,
illness, and old age— the common soldiery
of the New Right many be devoted to
single issues, but the New Right's
leadership most definitely is not.
Faith and morals are one thing; fooling
around with a man's paycheck is
another.
The New Right has some
interesting plans for its followers,
which its followers aren't going to
like. (Davis, 1981:26)
Oberschall writes that in order to sustain
resistance or protest,

"an organizational base and

continuity in leadership are necessary."
1973:119)

(Oberschall,

The New Right has a strong organizational

base, and it has demonstrated its skillfulness at
networking and coalition-building.

Viguerie, Dolan,

Weyrich and Phillips continue to provide strong leader
ship for the New Right.

Although the leadership's

dream of forging a conservative majority which will
take control of the nation's political processes does
not, at present, seem likely to be realized, the New
Right nevertheless,

still represents a strong political

force in American politics.
While both liberal Sociology and Marxist theory
have contributed to the understanding of American
conservatism and the rise of right-wing movements,
neither was prepared for, nor could adequately explain,
the political success of the New Right in the late 1970s
and the early 1980s.

In 1963 Richard Rovere said that
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the radical right organizations symbolize "frantic efforts
to prevent ultraconservatism from dying out."
1963:32-33)

(Bell,

And Seymour Martin Lipset predicted that

"it is extremely doubtful that the radical right will
grow beyond the peak of 1953-53."

(Lipset,

1963:29)

Although it was through its study of the radical right
that modern political sociology grew to maturity, the
sociologists who studied the right in the 1950s and
1960s nevertheless failed to develop an analysis of
right-wing movements that could adequately explain the
success of the current New Right movement.

(Wolfe,

1981:4)

In 1955* The New American Right was published;
its contributors included Daniel Bell, Talcott Parsons,
Richard Hofstadter and Seymour Martin Lipset.

These

essays were later updated and republished as The Radical
Right in 1963* with new essays by the original authors
as well as contributions by new authors.

These essays

were among the first "significant attempts to understand
the American right with the tools of modern social
science."

(Wolfe,

1981:7)

The authors of The Radical Right felt that postwar
American prosperity was the root condition for conserv
ative sentiment.

While depressions and unemployment

generally inspire left-wing protest, prosperity,
especially if accompanied by inflation, generates
right-wing protest.

"Prosperity", Bell argued,

"brings

in its wake new social groups, new social strains, and
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new social anxieties."

(Bell, 1963:^7)

The radical right

were the "dispossessed"— those groups who were left
behind by modernism, one of the main products of
prosperity.

The politics of the radical right, he

said, were the politics of frustration,

"the sour

impotence of those who find themselves unable to under
stand,

let alone command, the complex mass society that

is the polity today."

(Bell, 1963:31)

The contributors to The Radical Right downplayed
class as an explanation for conservative sentiment, and
instead elevated the concept of status politics.
This concept held that factors such as declining prestige
and status frustrations were responsible for right-wing
movements, more so than were economic factors.
politics

"arise during periods of prosperity,

Status
especially

when full employment is accompanied by inflation, and
when many individuals are able to improve their economic
position."

(Lipset,

1963:260)

Groups that are receptive

to status-oriented appeals include
those groups already possessing status
who feel that the rapid social change
threatens their own claims to high
social position, or enables previously
lower status groups to claim equal
status with their own. (Lipset, 1963:260)
The New Right's success in times of economic
difficulty challenges the prosperity hypothesis.
While inflation in the 1980s has, as Bell predicted,
spurred right-wing activism,

so too has high levels of
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unemploy men t.

"If anything, the right has become

stronger in an era of limited prosperity and slow growth."
(Wolfe,

1981:9)

And while status politics helps to

explain the appeal of the New Right to those sectors
of the population— primarily "middle America"— who felt
bypassed and put down by the changes brought about by the
social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, it alone is
inadequate in explaining the rise of the right.

While

the concept of status politics was an important
sociological contribution,

the fact that Hofstadter and

Lipset emphasized it almost to the exclusion of class,
weakened it.

For example, the tax revolt in California,

as represented by Proposition 13* was led by the right
and played a significant part in the New Right's success.
However,

status politics cannot account for the tax

revolt.
One can develop all kinds of theories
about opposition to taxes, but none of
them are more compelling than the fact
that lower taxes mean higher personal
income, and in a time of economic
trouble, direct gains in personal income
are more easily chosen over indirect
ones in public service.
Surely the
popular vote for Proposition 13 in
California was due more to an economic
squeeze than a massive decline in status
on the part of 60% of the state's
voting population. (Wolfe, 1981:12-13)
Where the liberal sociologists tended to neglect
class politics, Marxist theory emphasizes it.

But

Marxist theory also demonstrates weaknesses in analyzing
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Marxist theory of the state holds that

ideology speaks for interest, and yet the New Right
asserts its ideology even when it is not in its interest
to do so.

"In A m e r i c a ... the most ideological segment

of the political universe is the right wing, and a
theory that conflates ideology and interest will miss
much of its significance." (Wolfe, 1981:15)
Both Marxist theory and liberal Sociology could
not account for the primacy of family and sexual issues
to the New Right's political program.

Petchesky argues

that "what has given the New Right both ideological
legitimacy and organizational coherence in this period
has been its focus on reproductive and sexual issues."
(Petchesky,

1981:207)

And yet both the Marxist and

liberal disciplines have been "uncomfortable" with these
issues, often relegating them to the sidelines.

And so

it was not until the development of feminist theory in
the 1970s that the radical critique of right-wing
movements began to understand the centrality of these
concerns.

(Wolfe,

1 9 8 1 :l4)

By opening up for political analysis and exam
ination such areas as the family,

sex roles, reproduction,

etc., feminists had extended their critique into areas
unacknowledged as "political."

Feminism asked questions

that had been declared as "nonquestions."
...if feminist theory has contributed
any insight to an understanding of
modern capitalist society, it is in
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having revealed the illusion of a
split between a 'private1 and a
'public' world that bourgeois
culture embodies.
Feminism penetrates
this boundary between 'public' and
'private,' revealing for political
^ scrutiny the realms of life that
bourgeois society had consigned to
a sacred 'privacy'— marriage, the
family, childrearing, maternity; sex,
of whatever variety; personal,
'private' relations, especially
between women and men, wherever they
occur.
Feminism calls forth all
these unspoken, personal relations
and renames them as political
questions, questions of power and
social determination.
Earlier, Marxism
had illuminated the social character
of 'private property'— capital, labor
power, ground rent— was a personal
attribute.
But feminism goes further
to the root of the problem because it
demystifies the category of privacy
itself. (Petchesky, 1981:223)
Much of the New Right's success in building a
popular base of support has been through its mobilization
of sentiments concerned with family and cultural issues.
The centrality of the politics of family, sexuality,
and reproduction to the New Right's rise to power bears
out feminist theory's assertion of the political nature
of these issues.
What feminists for generations have been
urging— that issues related to the
family, sexuality, and reproduction are
political at their roots, that they ramify
on every level of public and social life—
has been squarely brought home to
everyone by the staunches foes of feminism.
(Petchesky, 1981:209)
Feminist theory can help "clarify and critique
the dominant mode of discourse, the dominant ideology
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of legitimation,
adopted."

that an ascendant conservatism has

(Petchesky,

1981:223)

That ideology of

legitimation for the New Right is "privatism."

The

right-wing attacks on abortion constitute a reconcept
ualization of what is private and what is public.

The

New Right has used antiabortion politics to reassert its
view of privacy; but, as Petchesky points out, privacy
for the New Right becomes a corporate attribute.

It is

privacy for corporate bodies— such as business, the
patriarchal family, the church and school— that is
intended, not individual privacy.
There has been a tendency, by those who study
right-wing movements, to downgrade the rationality of
the Right and to view it in a condescending fashion.
Hofstadter's statement that the "pseudo-conservative
tends to be more than ordinarily incoherent about politics"
is an illustration of this attitude."
1963:77)

(Hofstadter,

This attitude holds the risk of failing to

take seriously the political impact of right-wing
movements as well as the material conditions and political
climate that produce them.
Petchesky notes that while the language and
symbolism of the New Right "often take a mystical and
irrational form, their ends are nevertheless coherent
and clear."

(Petchesky,

pro-family movement,

1981:23*0

she maintains,

The New Right's
should not be written
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off as mere opportunism or religious fanaticism.

It has

achieved a measure of national political power as well
as popular support because "it is in fact a response
to real material conditions and deeplying fears, a
response that is utterly reactionary, but nevertheless
attune."

(Petchesky,

1981:236-237)

The political values

and social changes that the New Right's pro-family
movement are fighting against are real and pervasive.
Both the women's and gay liberation
movements, on the one hand, and the
structural changes in the family that
have been both cause and effect of these
movements, represent a genuine threat
to the type of family system and the
sexual morality that the New Right is
seeking to preserve. (Petchesky,
1 9 8 1 :23*0
Right-wing movements are backlash movements and
the New Right is reacting against, and trying to turn
back the tide of, the changes brought about by the
social movements and liberal social policies of the
1960s and 1970s.
The loss of control that the people in
the New Right feel is real.
Changes in
state and society have deprived the
elements of the middle strata of certain
forms of control they had previously
had over their social, economic,
and cultural milieu.
The changes in
the organization of capitalism, the
increased role of the state in regulating
economic and social and cultural relations,
the 1960s movements of minorities, women,
students and cultural radicals, the
threats world-wide from allies as well
as foes to US hegemony— all these have
been experienced as threats to the solid
middle of America. (Hunter, 1981:135)

129.
It was through the study of radical right movements
in the 1950s and early 1960s that important and enduring
contributions in Sociology were made.

However, the New

Right's success in setting the agenda for political
discourse in the late 1970s and early 1980s has pointed
to weaknesses

(as well as strengths) in Sociology's

understanding of the dynamics of the radical Right.

Where

liberal Sociology and Marxist theory have been weak
in analyzing the family and sexual politics of the New
Right,

feminist theory has been strong, and has made

important contributions in this area.

The current

resurgence in right-wing sentiment and activism has
both rekindled interest in, and demonstrated the need
for, continued sociological examination of the radical
Right.
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